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ABSTRACT—Conventional wisdom suggests that a constitutional right 
should be defined so as to effectively constrain government actors. A right 
defined in terms of what state actors routinely do would seem to impose in 
practice an ineffectual brake on much intrusive state action—and so seems 
pointless. Nevertheless, in defining Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme 
Court frequently draws on the practice of contemporaneous government 
actors to define the constitutional floor for police action. The actions of the 
regulated thus define the content of regulation. This Article isolates and 
analyzes this seemingly paradoxical judicial practice, which it labels “Fourth 
Amendment gloss,” by analogy to methodological practices elsewhere in 
constitutional law. The latter is examined through a comparison to a similar, 
albeit not identical, mode of reasoning used in separation of powers cases. 
The justifications for gloss in the latter domain are more fully developed and 
hence provide useful benchmarks for evaluation of Fourth Amendment 
gloss. The Article’s first aim is descriptive—to catalog the various ways in 
which “gloss,” or official practice, is deployed across the Court’s search and 
seizure case law. This exercise shows that many frequently exercised search 
and seizure powers have been constitutionally defined in terms of official 
practice. The Article’s second aim is to ask whether judicial reliance on such 
gloss can be justified. There are three general justifications for the use of 
official practice as a source of law in constitutional interpretation. These can 
be labeled the acquiescence, Burkean, and settlement justifications. A careful 
examination of the empirical and theoretical contexts of the Fourth 
Amendment suggests, however, that none of these three justifications 
supports gloss’s use as a way to define lawful searches and seizures. If gloss 
persists today, therefore, it is for institutional and ideological reasons—not 
because it is theoretically warranted. Given this conclusion, the Article offers 
ways to limit the error costs associated with the use of Fourth Amendment 
gloss. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional rights supposedly constrain government actors.1 To 
restrain the state in some meaningful way, a right must place out of lawful 
bounds some activities that government would otherwise do or else require 
some action that government would otherwise abjure. The U.S. Constitution 
largely enumerates the first, negative, kind of right against government 
interference.2 So to define those constitutional rights in terms of what the 
government ordinarily does might seem an exercise in futility. After all, a 
right defined in terms of ordinary state practice would engender no 
 
 1 This explains Professor Ronald Dworkin’s canonical formulation of rights as “trumps.” RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184–205 (1977); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, 
AND UTOPIA 29 (1974) (describing rights as “side constraints”). 
 2 The U.S. Constitution largely adumbrates negative rights. But cf. David P. Currie, Positive and 
Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) (“From the beginning there have 
been cases in which the Supreme Court, sometimes very persuasively, has found in negatively 
phrased provisions constitutional duties that can in some sense be described as positive.”). 
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meaningful gain in liberty.3 Why, one might plausibly wonder, would 
anyone bother to write down such a right in the first place? Under what 
circumstances, one might ask, would such a right likely be violated? 
This Article concerns a zone of constitutional rights jurisprudence that 
seems to disobey this seemingly foundational presupposition. When 
delineating the Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, the Supreme Court frequently draws on the official practice of 
regulated government actors today as a source of constitutional meaning. I 
call this reliance on official practice “Fourth Amendment gloss,” by rough 
analogy to the judicial practice of looking to post-ratification interbranch 
dynamics as a source of “historical gloss” in separation of powers disputes.4 
The analogy is not, to be clear, an exact one. There are important 
differences in the circumstances in which Fourth Amendment issues arise. 
Whereas the structural constitutional context typically involves a small 
number of institutions engaged in iterated interactions, the Fourth 
Amendment concerns thousands of dispersed officers and magistrates acting 
in disarticulated parallel. But the analogy between doctrinal fields is still a 
useful one, and the contextual differences are easy to exaggerate. Some 
structural constitutional issues arise in dispersed and iterative contexts—
questions of removal authority and commandeering, for example—so the 
contextual difference should not be overstated. Moreover, it is hard to see 
why there should be an acoustic separation between the methodological 
foundations of different veins of constitutional interpretation. Choices of 
hermeneutic method are generally conceived as general—not clause-
specific—in character. By analyzing how the precisely honed and 
extensively analyzed justifications for judicial reliance on official practice in 
the separation of powers context translate across those differences to the 
Fourth Amendment context, it is possible to gain new perspective on the 
epistemic and legal value of official practice as a guide to search and seizure 
law. 
That perspective yields deflationary results: The analogies and parallels 
explored here provide powerful reasons to conclude that judicial reliance on 
“gloss” in the Fourth Amendment context is not as well supported as it is in 
other domains. If the notion of Fourth Amendment gloss seems 
counterintuitive, then that is as it should be. 
 
 3 Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1315 (1984) (“Having a constitutional right to perform a given act means, 
at least, that one may perform that act without governmental interference.”). 
 4 See Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1523 (2018) 
(book review) (discussing the role of “historical ‘gloss’” in separation of powers jurisprudence); see 
also infra Section I.A (exploring the scholarly literature on separation of powers gloss). 
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My first aim in this Article is thus descriptive: I want to isolate the 
significant role that official practice plays in one vital part of our 
constitutional law of policing.5 I also want to cast a spotlight on how the 
Court defines what the state can do in terms of what the state in fact does. 
Official practice as a basis for Fourth Amendment protection has played a 
pivotal role in recent cases concerning the interaction of new technologies 
and the law of search and seizure. Although I will substantiate this point by 
a careful analysis of the overall doctrine, it is useful to introduce the idea of 
Fourth Amendment gloss with two recent examples, both of which concern 
the impact of technology on constitutional protection from state searches and 
seizures. Although Fourth Amendment gloss did not prevail in both cases, 
they still crisply illustrate the kinds of roles that it can play.  
First, in Carpenter v. United States, the Court considered whether 
government acquisition of cell-site locational data from a suspect’s 
telecommunications provider counted as a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.6 For a majority of the Court, the case concerned “a new 
phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person’s past movements through the 
record of his cell phone signals.”7 Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority 
opinion hinged on a distinction between cell-site locational data and other 
kinds of information historically obtained by the government without a 
warrant. He stressed that “novel circumstances” required a fresh 
consideration of the principle that records held by third parties fell outside 
the Fourth Amendment’s scope.8 History thus had no bite. 
In contrast, the main dissent by Justice Anthony Kennedy viewed the 
essential continuity of warrantless acquisition of cell-site data and previous 
investigative practices as a legitimating basis for the government’s action. 
Cell-site acquisition, Justice Kennedy stressed, was both “reasonable” and 
“accepted.”9 He then placed emphasis on “the longstanding rule that the 
Government may use compulsory process to compel persons to disclose 
documents and other evidence within their possession and control.”10 Such 
use of compulsory disclosure was “well established,” explained Justice 
 
 5 I am focused here on the Fourth Amendment. Official practice plays a role in other criminal 
procedure domains. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (relying on the American Bar 
Association Standards for Criminal Justice to define constitutionally adequate defense counsel conduct 
in a capital case). The analysis here might be extended to those domains, but I do not pursue that 
possibility here. 
 6 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–15 (2018) (considering whether acquisition of cell-site locational data 
from a third-party data provider constitutes a “search”). 
 7 Id. at 2216. 
 8 Id. at 2217. 
 9 Id. at 2223 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 10 Id. at 2228. 
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Kennedy, “even when the records contain private information.”11 Indeed, this 
practice was so entrenched that it had created a “reliance” interest on the part 
of police, “state and federal grand juries, state and federal administrative 
agencies, and state and federal legislative bodies.”12 Hence, for Justice 
Kennedy, the sheer fact of continuous usage legitimated a state practice 
under the Fourth Amendment, notwithstanding intervening technological 
change. 
A central difference between the Carpenter majority and its dissent was 
the extent to which the Justices were willing to perceive warrantless 
acquisition of cell-site data as a (necessarily legitimate) extension of an older 
practice, as distinct from a novelty requiring fresh thinking. Carpenter is 
unusual only insofar as the argument from historical practice failed. 
A similar choice between the embrace of historical continuity and the 
recognition of a technological rupture informs the various opinions in United 
States v. Jones, a second case concerning new means of information 
acquisition.13 Jones unanimously held that police could not engage in the 
warrantless placement and tracking of a global positioning system (GPS) 
device on a suspect’s vehicle because, as in Carpenter, such conduct 
constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.14 Whereas Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion framed the case as an application of a 
longstanding trespass-based rule, the concurring opinions of Justices Sonia 
Sotomayor and Samuel Alito stressed the issue’s novelty—and, critically, 
the absence of any tradition of analogous police practice.15 Stated otherwise, 
for the concurring Justices in Jones, as for the majority in Carpenter, the 
absence of an analogous historical gloss was fatal to the government’s case 
for the validity of warrantless GPS tracking under the Fourth Amendment. 
Jones and Carpenter are not methodological outliers. Official practice 
plays a central role across a large swath of Fourth Amendment law in three 
different ways. First, it has played a central role in titrating the authority that 
police have to make arrests without a warrant. Second, it has configured the 
path of Fourth Amendment law in respect to vehicular stops. And third, it 
has been invoked to justify and also to constrain the supply of remedies for 
 
 11 Id. at 2228–29. 
 12 Id. at 2229 (citations omitted). 
 13 565 U.S. 400, 404–11 (2012). 
 14 Id. at 404. 
 15 Compare id. at 405 (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law 
trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”), with id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he same technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance 
techniques . . . also affect the [Fourth Amendment threshold] test by shaping the evolution of societal 
privacy expectations.”), and id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (accusing the Court of 
“disregard[ing] what is really important”: the use of a GPS device, by focusing on the trespass). 
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constitutional violations in the context of criminal trials.16 In these cases, 
practice’s relevance has often impinged more acutely than in Jones and 
Carpenter. Or at least this is what the descriptive element of my project 
suggests. 
The Article’s second contribution is evaluative—Is Fourth Amendment 
gloss, I ask, a good idea? To analyze that question, I draw on larger 
methodological debates in structural constitutional law. Here, the idea of 
gloss has received far more sustained attention. Of course, the kind of official 
practice at issue in structural constitutional cases is quite distinct from the 
sort at stake in Fourth Amendment cases. But the justifications for reliance 
on practice have been much more extensively studied in respect to the 
separation of powers. And there is no reason to think that interpretive 
foundations should vary between constitutional provisions. 
My aim here is to benefit from that growing scholarship on historical 
gloss in the separation of powers context by asking whether the justifications 
identified there can be translated over to the (less well explored) Fourth 
Amendment context. To this end, I identify three theoretical grounds for 
giving weight to official practice as a source of constitutional meaning. All 
three justifications are quite general in form. First, gloss might be evidence 
of acquiescence to a practice by official actors who have freestanding 
authority to interpret the Constitution. Giving weight to their judgments 
appropriately implicates the Constitution’s distribution of interpretive 
authority across distinct institutions. Second, gloss may be the distillate of 
experience over years and generations. As such, it may represent a kind of 
Burkean wisdom not to be lightly dismissed. Third, gloss may be valuable 
simply because it represents a focal equilibrium for officials and citizens. As 
such, it may serve as a settlement to enable coordination around the defense 
of constitutional norms. If after having accounted for the three broad grounds 
of acquiescence, epistemic value, and settlement value as justifications for 
Fourth Amendment gloss, there remains an explanatory gap, it might be 
plausible to conclude that such a gap cannot be filled. 
These three theoretical foundations for the use of official practice as a 
source of constitutional meaning largely fail, I conclude, to provide a 
satisfying foundation for the practice of Fourth Amendment gloss. The 
acquiescence justification works in the separation of powers context because 
coordinate branches of the federal government can provide legitimating 
acquiescence to each other’s practices.17 But in the Fourth Amendment 
context, it is not easy to identify a class of official actors charged with 
 
 16 These points of doctrine are developed infra in Part II. 
 17 See infra Section III.A. 
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making careful determinations of constitutionality in response to new forms 
of search and seizure. The dialogic process of acquiescence, therefore, falls 
short in this context. The Burkean justification, in contrast, proves to be 
incompatible with the political economy, information economy, and history 
of the actors regulated by the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the possibility that 
gloss might serve as coordinating settlement fails to fit observed usages of 
official practice presently found in the law reports. 
Just because all three of the most plausible justifications for Fourth 
Amendment gloss fail does not mean that judges will cease to engage in the 
practice. Indeed, powerful institutional and ideological compulsions support 
the practice, quite independent of its merits. Given the likelihood that courts 
will continue to rely on gloss, even when doing so is normatively unjustified, 
I conclude by sketching how the practice’s error costs might at least be 
cabined. 
Despite its pervasive use, the practice of Fourth Amendment gloss 
remains peripheral to scholarly debates. Perhaps this relative marginality 
arises because gloss matters most to the mechanics of Fourth Amendment 
law only after the Court has determined what counts as a “search.” The 
threshold topic tends to receive the lion’s share of scholarly attention.18 Less 
well studied are the rather unglamorous procedural questions of what steps 
the Government must take to make a search lawful and what remedies follow 
when these steps are not taken. 
While legal scholars have not addressed Fourth Amendment gloss 
systematically, my analysis here draws inspiration from, and extends, earlier 
scholarship on searches and seizures. In 1974, Professor Anthony 
Amsterdam expressed “hope for the prospect of police self-regulation 
through the process of departmental rulemaking,” but cautioned that 
“considerable nudging” from the courts would be required for this to 
 
 18 A sampling of the most prominent scholarship includes William Baude & James Y. Stern, 
The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1877 (2016) (reasoning 
that, under the positive law model, a court may decide to apply the waiver of positive law rights to 
Fourth Amendment protections for threshold search and seizure questions); Sherry F. Colb, What Is 
a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002) (asking “what is a search?” when determining what Fourth 
Amendment protections apply based on “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy”); Orin S. Kerr, Four 
Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 528 (2007) (explaining Fourth 
Amendment doctrine as including two questions: (1) what is a search, and (2) under what 
circumstances is a search reasonable); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual 
Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 
205, 211 (including “perceived intrusiveness” of a search as relevant to reasonable expectations of 
privacy per Fourth Amendment doctrine); and Richard M. Re, Fourth Amendment Fairness, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 1409, 1413 (2018) (contending “a search or seizure is unreasonable when any 
principle that permitted it would be one that a Fourth Amendment rights holder could reasonably 
reject”). 
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happen.19 Professor Amsterdam was not concerned, though, with practice as 
opposed to formal rulemaking and so does not provide an exact precursor to 
my contribution (although his seminal paper casts a necessarily long shadow 
over any academic inquiry into the Fourth Amendment). A more closely 
path-marking antecedent is Professor David Sklansky’s work on the role of 
common law concepts from the time of the Fourth Amendment’s ratification 
in the Fourth Amendment law of the 1990s.20 As I detail below, gloss is 
distinct from the common law materials with which Professor Sklansky 
reckoned.21 But his general approach of situating the Fourth Amendment in 
the larger body of constitutional doctrine is admirable and merits attention. 
A more recent precursor to my analysis is Professor Anna Lvovsky’s recent 
historicizing intervention, which focuses on the midcentury origins of 
judicial deference to police expertise.22 She approaches some of the same 
issues as my analysis here—in particular the epistemic arguments for gloss—
but does so from a historical perspective rather than a doctrinal one. Her 
interest is in understanding the origins of certain judicial practices and not 
analyzing their coherence within the larger fabric of constitutional doctrine. 
Professors Sklansky’s and Lvovsky’s works provide intellectual coordinates 
from which the present inquiry presses forward.23 
The paper proceeds in four steps. In the first Part, I set out the uses of 
gloss in other domains of constitutional law. I tease out three distinct 
rationales for turning to observed practice as a source of constitutional 
meaning. These rationales are intended to serve as a framework for 
evaluating Fourth Amendment gloss. The second Part then makes a detailed 
 
 19 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 379–80 
(1974). But Professor Amsterdam’s project is rather different from mine. He expressed the hope that the 
Court would require policing be “conducted pursuant to and in conformity with either legislation or police 
departmental rules and regulations” to comply with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 416. I am focused here 
on the actual (rather than recommended) use of practice (rather than regulation) in the doctrine. Hence, 
my project here is quite different from Professor Amsterdam’s. 
 20 David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 
1743 (2000) (noting that the Court “has made the principal criterion for identifying violations of the 
Fourth Amendment ‘whether a particular governmental action . . . was regarded as an unlawful 
search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999)). 
 21 See infra text accompanying notes 82–91. 
 22 Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 
1998–99 (2017) (“Starting in the 1950s, judges came to rely on the promise of police expertise—the 
notion that trained, experienced officers develop rarefied and reliable insight into crime—to expand 
police authority in multiple areas of the law.”). 
 23 Another more recent article takes up the question of how and when local government practice 
should be relevant to constitutional adjudication. See Brandon L. Garrett, Local Evidence in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (documenting ways in which 
the courts have looked at local practice to define constitutional norms). 
113:701 (2019) Fourth Amendment Gloss 
709 
descriptive case for the pivotal role that gloss has played across the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudential waterfront. I aim to show that gloss shapes many 
commonly employed rules of Fourth Amendment law––in particular those 
concerning warrantless arrests, searches of individuals, and vehicular stops; 
it also shapes the Court’s remedial choices. Part Three considers whether the 
available theoretical rationales for gloss—identified in other domains of 
constitutional law—support its use in the Fourth Amendment context. The 
result here is largely negative: few normatively persuasive grounds exist for 
using gloss in the Fourth Amendment context. Finally, I turn in Part Four to 
the question of what follows from this negative assessment. I suggest that 
courts will continue to employ gloss for ideological and institutional reasons, 
but there are ways to mitigate the associated costs. 
I. USING GLOSS IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
This Part explores the scope and function of gloss as evidence of 
meaning in constitutional jurisprudence. This entails first offering a 
definition of gloss as it has emerged in other domains of constitutional law. 
I develop this definition through an explication of the reasons the Court and 
sympathetic scholars have tendered for reliance on historical practice. 
A. Gloss as a Source of Constitutional Meaning 
The idea of a post-ratification institutional practice as an illuminating 
gloss on open-textured constitutional provisions is most closely associated 
with Justice Felix Frankfurter’s concurrence in the Steel Seizure case.24 In 
that opinion, Justice Frankfurter defined gloss as “a systematic, unbroken, 
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never 
before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold 
the Constitution.”25 This definition is not without its ambiguities.26 Still, 
Justice Frankfurter’s idea of gloss can be usefully decomposed into three 
constituent parts using his own verbal formulation as a starting point: (1) a 
historical practice by an official actor akin to the President; (2) that is 
temporally durable rather than momentary and fleeting; and (3) that has been 
recognized and endorsed by other official institutions, such as Congress. This 
definition is best understood as a core case of gloss or practice that is useful 
to orient discussion as an initial matter. It is not meant to exclude the 
 
 24 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). For an account of the provenance of the term, see Curtis A. Bradley & 
Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413, 
418 (2012). 
 25 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 26 See infra text accompanying notes 41–46 (documenting ambiguities). 
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possibility that an official practice be legally relevant even if it lacks one of 
the three conditions. Indeed, an important implication of Part II is that 
official practice can turn out to count as gloss without strictly satisfying all 
of Justice Frankfurter’s requirements. At the same time, the definition is 
useful insofar as it clarifies that gloss should be understood as distinct from 
the ideas of deference, which does not turn on the observation that a practice 
of some sort exists, or cognate notions. 
Justice Frankfurter’s idea of historical gloss has been repeatedly pressed 
into service in the Court’s separation of powers jurisprudence. It is “an 
important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that 
practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the 
founding era.”27 For instance, gloss plays a role in the Court’s judgments on 
recess appointments,28 interbranch commissions (such as the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission),29 the pocket veto,30 the unwritten executive power 
to preempt state laws on foreign affairs grounds,31 and the Executive’s power 
to “recognize” other nations.32 In all these jurisprudential domains, the post-
ratification practices of Executive Branch actors—provided they are open, 
notorious, and uncontested—do double-duty as evidence of how 
constitutional ambiguity should be resolved. In other words, gloss operates 
as positive evidence of constitutionality. 
At other times, courts take the absence of historical practice as proof of 
the absence of constitutional authority. Examples of gloss’s negative use can 
be found in the Court’s Article III and anti-commandeering jurisprudences. 
For example, when considering a federal statute that purported to reopen a 
federal court’s final judgment, the Court observed that there was “no [other] 
instance in which Congress has attempted to set aside the final judgment of 
 
 27 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400–01 (1989) (using gloss to conclude that the 
Constitution did not bar “judicial participation in certain extrajudicial activity”). 
 30 The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established practice is a 
consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this 
character.”). 
 31 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“[T]he historical gloss on the 
‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President’s ‘vast share 
of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). 
 32 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (“[T]he President since 
the founding has exercised this unilateral power to recognize new states—and the Court has endorsed 
the practice.”). For a skeptical view of gloss’s role in Zivotofsky, see Curtis A. Bradley, Agora: 
Reflections on Zivotofsky v. Kerry: Historical Gloss, the Recognition Power, and Judicial Review, 
109 AJIL UNBOUND 2, 2 (2016) (“[W]hereas in some cases historical practice shapes perceptions 
about other interpretive materials, in Zivotofsky II the principal direction of influence was the other 
way around.”). 
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an Article III court by retroactive legislation,” a “prolonged reticence” that 
“would be amazing if such interference were not understood to be 
constitutionally proscribed.”33 Similarly, in fashioning an anti-
commandeering prohibition to protect states’ sovereign prerogatives from 
federal takeover, the Court has repeatedly underscored the idea that an 
absence of historical practice lends credence to a constitutional challenge.34 
Most recently, in a challenge to the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act, Justice Alito echoed his Jones opinion and reaffirmed the 
salience of gloss’s absence by drawing attention to the “unprecedented” and 
“isolated” nature of the federal commandeering at issue there.35 
Positive and negative uses of gloss are not identical. The inference 
taken from an absence of practice tends to be more narrowly gauged than the 
inference drawn from affirmative practice. The absence of practice is 
generally taken solely as circumstantial evidence that many generations of 
political leaders believed a power to be without constitutional authority, 
which must be considered in light of other potential reasons for government 
inaction.36 The Court has never even hinted that desuetude might directly 
cause the absence of authority. It has never, that is, made a symmetrical 
claim to Justice Frankfurter’s assertion in his Steel Seizure concurrence that 
the mere persistence of desuetude can directly create a new species of 
institutional power that did not previously exist. Inaction, then, is not as 
powerful a gloss as action. 
So deployed, gloss has spilled over only intermittently beyond 
separation of powers and federalism jurisprudence. In the 2016 case of 
Evenwel v. Abbott, for instance, the Court adjudicated a challenge to states’ 
reliance on total population, as opposed to the population of eligible voters, 
for legislative districting.37 The Court upheld Texas’s practice of using total 
population by looking to the “settled practice” of “all 50 States and countless 
local jurisdictions . . . for decades, even centuries.”38 In First Amendment 
 
 33 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995). 
 34 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 175–76 (1992). Similar arguments are found in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012) (plurality opinion) (noting that “the lack 
of historical precedent” is a “telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 
(2010))). 
 35 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018). 
 36 Of course, the absence of legislative action can be explained by many factors in a 
governmental system characterized by veto-gates and novel policy crises. Leah M. Litman, 
Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1429–48 (2017) (cataloging alternative causes of 
novelty). 
 37 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016). 
 38 Id. 
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cases, too, the Court has accounted for “widespread and time-tested” state 
practice in evaluating the constitutionality of an election regulation.39 
Despite being rather theoretically underwhelming—the Court, that is, saying 
nothing about why historical practice is relevant—these isolated examples 
imply that an official practice can be constitutionally significant even when 
it involves the independent, uncoordinated actions of plural sovereigns (i.e., 
different states) at distinct moments in historical time. In Evenwel, for 
example, the use of a voter population metric for redistricting extended 
across every state in the nation and downward to many substate 
jurisdictions.40 The Court, moreover, did not ask for evidence that all these 
jurisdictions were acting in concert or speaking from the same hymnal. The 
independent, uncoordinated quality of a state practice posed no obstacle to 
judicial reliance on gloss. This should be enough to rebut the notion that 
official practice counts only when the number of actors involved is small (as 
in the separation of powers context but not the Fourth Amendment domain). 
Notwithstanding its diffusion across diverse domains of constitutional 
law, the idea of gloss remains imprecise along several margins. First, it is not 
clear how the relevant institutional practice is defined.41 An official practice 
can often be defined at different levels of generality. The more general and 
abstract the description, the wider the shadow cast by a historical practice on 
contemporary constitutional meaning. Second, although it is clear that gloss 
need not be anchored in the early Republic, it is not clear how long a practice 
must endure before it ripens into significance for constitutional 
interpretation. How many instances of a discrete action, for instance, must 
be observed before the terms gloss or practice are warranted? The case law 
yields no answer. Third, in the separation of powers context, there is a 
question of what exactly constitutes acquiescence by the coordinate branches 
sufficient to induce a practice’s ratification.42 The definition of acquiescence 
might be thought to vary across different branches of government. Congress, 
for example, might face transaction costs in overcoming its collective action 
problems that do not hinder the Executive Branch.43 Acquiescence by the 
 
 39 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992) (plurality opinion); see also Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (observing that an “unbroken practice” followed “openly and by 
affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside”). 
 40 136 S. Ct. at 1132. 
 41 Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 77 (2013) 
(exploring this unit-of-analysis question in a response to Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor 
Morrison). 
 42 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24, at 440–44 (discussing difficulties that Congress has in 
manifesting an absence of acquiescence). 
 43 Id. at 448 (noting that “it is precarious to infer congressional acquiescence” from “the absence 
of legislation prohibiting the executive action in question”). In contrast, a recent study of 
nonexecutive foreign relations matters has also underscored the gap between Congress’s and the 
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latter might therefore be calibrated in less demanding terms in light of the 
lower risk that inaction or ambiguous action will be mistaken for 
endorsement. 
Finally, assuming the relevant practice and responsive acquiescence are 
defined with sufficient clarity, we must also decide what weight a federal 
court will assign to gloss in the process of resolving a constitutional question. 
A court might treat evidence of historical gloss merely as evidence of 
historical actors’ understanding of the Constitution, as in the commandeering 
cases.44 In other instances, gloss supplies a complete and dispositive answer 
to a question left open by constitutional text.45 Rather more subtly, in yet 
other cases “historical practice can affect perceptions about the clarity or 
ambiguity of the text.”46 How to characterize gloss’s relationship to other 
sources of constitutional meaning, moreover, remains an open question. 
Probably the most that can be said for now is that courts weigh various 
sources of constitutional meaning implicitly and imprecisely. This may not 
be a bad thing. Perhaps it is possible to create a more precise algorithm for 
deciding how to weigh text, original meaning, precedent, purpose, and gloss. 
But it is far from clear that routinizing constitutional interpretation in this 
fashion would have a desirable effect on the ineffable and very human art of 
judging.47 
B. Justifications for the Use of Gloss as a Source of  
Constitutional Meaning 
Jurists and scholars alike have become so inured to invocations of gloss 
in constitutional argument that they have ceased to notice how peculiar they 
are. Reliance on official practice to resolve a constitutional dispute might 
first be taken to imply that there is no evidence contemporaneous to the 
 
Executive’s capacity to respond to another branch’s practice-based assertions of constitutional 
authority. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 609, 615 (2018) (positing that “[t]he comparative ease with which the president can 
respond to actions by the nonexecutive branches suggests that silence by the executive is a more 
meaningful signal of approval or acquiescence than silence by Congress”). 
 44 See supra note 34. 
 45 For an instance in which gloss has played a seemingly conclusive role, see Dames & Moore 
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981), in which the Court relied upon gloss as a source of authority for 
a presidential action in the absence of explicit statutory authority. 
 46 Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and 
Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 41–42; accord Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty 
Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 784 (2014) (noting that gloss has been an 
important tool in allowing the Court to find and interpret ambiguity in constitutional text). 
 47 For a landmark effort to show that “constitutional interpretation is, after all, less free-form an 
exercise” than some suppose, see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: 
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1227 
(1995). 
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Constitution’s enactment that resolves the dispute. Indeed, Justice 
Frankfurter sliced cleanly between “the words of the Constitution” and “the 
gloss which life has written upon them” as two distinct sources of law.48 
Historical gloss, moreover, looks at the actions of elected and appointed 
actors, often pursuing local and idiosyncratic policy agendas, as a source of 
new meaning of the Constitution that empowers those subsequent iterations 
of those officials. Gloss thus can have an inherent circularity, at least when 
federal power is at stake.49 And when a court relies on gloss to reach a final 
judgment, it transmutes political actors’ inchoate, perhaps contested and 
contestable, perhaps even inarticulate situational sense into a hard, definite 
rule of constitutional law.50 This has consequences. Very concretely, 
violations of a judicially ratified gloss can precipitate damages and injunctive 
relief; gloss in the absence of judicial endorsement cannot.51 
Judicial reliance on officials’ practice, therefore, requires justification. 
Yet the Justices have not tried to explain why or when historical gloss should 
patch gaps in constitutional meaning (although they have offered a reason 
for using inaction as circumstantial evidence of shared constitutional 
understanding when evaluating the absence of a historical practice52). Into 
 
 48 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 49 To the extent that Fourth Amendment gloss is a product of local and state police action, it is 
not amenable to this circularity critique. Yet to date, gloss in the criminal procedure domain has 
tended to prioritize the judgments of federal over state actors. Cf. infra text accompanying note 131. 
 50 One way to think about gloss in the absence of judicial ratification is as a form of 
constitutional “convention.” Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional 
Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1854–55 (introducing this idea into 
U.S. constitutional discourse). Hence, Professors Curtis Bradley and Niel Siegel suggest that there 
is an analytic distinction between “practice-based norms that have legal status (in which case they 
constitute historical gloss) and those that do not (in which case they constitute constitutional 
conventions), regardless of whether they are subject to judicial review.” Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. 
Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 
105 GEO. L.J. 255, 267 (2017). I am not convinced, however, that in judicial consideration of gloss 
courts draw a crisp and clear distinction between patterns of official behavior based on the presence 
or absence of “legal status” (however that is defined). Professors Bradley and Siegel may thus offer 
a degree of analytic precision above and beyond what the judiciary’s observed practice would 
support. Where the relevant practice is shared among a highly decentralized and dispersed set of 
actors—as in the Fourth Amendment context—it becomes even harder to distinguish between the 
presence and absence of “legal status.” As a result, the distinction that Bradley and Siegel draw 
becomes even harder to sustain. 
 51 For a similar intuition, see Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the 
Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 69, 75 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (noting that “for 
some customary rules, there is no readily available hook, and as a consequence, political actors may 
be tempted to violate them” when they would not have violated a constitutional rule). 
 52 See infra Section II.A.2. 
113:701 (2019) Fourth Amendment Gloss 
715 
this gap, scholars have leapt.53 I thus draw on both case law and secondary 
sources to develop a set of justifications for courts’ use of gloss. Specifically, 
I map out three potential justifications for that practice in the literature: as 
acquiescence, Burkean wisdom, and settlement. 
First, “courts and other interpreters privilege acquiescence to historical 
practice” as reflecting an “agreement” among constitutionally relevant 
actors.54 One example of such bare acquiescence is Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, where the majority emphasized that “Congress has accepted the 
authority of the Executive to enter into settlement agreements.”55 The Court 
did so without alluding to any functional justifications Congress might have 
had for its acceptance. The mere fact of policy dialogue, leading to 
convergence, was enough to create gloss. 
Acquiescence from nonjudicial actors on the constitutionality of an 
action is relevant if one believes that the Court does not have a monopoly on 
the power to interpret the Constitution. In the separation of powers context, 
this kind of so-called “departmentalist” view of interpretive authority is 
common enough among commentators; it also forms a cornerstone of the 
political question doctrine.56 An acquiescence-based view of gloss, as its 
name suggests, is not predicated simply on the decision of the branch 
engaged in the relevant conduct. It also reflects the response such behavior 
elicits from other officials. That response is treated “as a kind of waiver of 
the affected branch’s institutional prerogatives.”57 In the separation of 
powers context, the acquiescence justification therefore trades upon the 
“negotiated” character of certain constitutional rules.58 On this view, the 
original Constitution is less a manifesto of negative restraint and more a 
menu of positive governance options to be employed in response to 
contingencies both known and unexpected. 
Second, a court might take the view that it owes no deference to other 
governmental actors’ constitutional judgments, but that their practical 
wisdom, embodied in a series of policy decisions, nonetheless warrants 
respect. On this “functional” approach, historical gloss comprises a body of 
“accumulated wisdom” to which courts owe deference.59 This justification 
 
 53 The leading piece is Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24 (defining and providing a clear 
general roadmap for the analysis of gloss). 
 54 Id. at 433. 
 55 453 U.S. 654, 681 (1981). 
 56 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24, at 434 & n.89 (collecting leading departmentalist texts). 
 57 Id. at 435. 
 58 For a defense of this idea of “negotiated” constitutional positions, see Aziz Z. Huq, The 
Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1607–10 (2014) (defining and giving 
examples of interbranch bargaining). 
 59 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24, at 427–28, 435. 
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sounds in a Burkean register inasmuch as it looks to what the English 
politician and political thinker Edmund Burke called “the collected reason 
of ages” as more likely to be correct than first-order reasoning by 
contemporary actors seeking to innovate against the grain of received 
wisdom.60 
Notice that the Burkean justification rests on a sort of intellectual parlor 
trick that, in other contexts, has discomforted the Justices. A policy judgment 
on the part of nonjudicial actors is metamorphosed into a rule of 
constitutional law that cannot be derogated by statute or qualified by official 
discretion. Practical wisdom (or its shadow), that is, is transmuted into law. 
In a different context, several members of the Court have expressed 
discomfort about decades-old doctrines of judicial deference to 
administrative agencies’ expert judgments on the meaning of ambiguous 
statutes.61 One Justice has gone so far as to suggest that such deference 
violates the Constitution’s separation of powers.62 The core concern 
propelling these critiques, as articulated by then-Judge Neil Gorsuch, speaks 
in terms of “concentrate[d] federal power” and “the abdication of the judicial 
duty.”63 Just this last Term, Justice Kennedy directed concern at a 
government actor’s power to define the scope of her own discretionary 
authority.64 These worries are worth keeping in mind when one turns to the 
Fourth Amendment. 
A rough analogy exists between judicial deference to other officials’ 
expertise-backed judgments about the Constitution (at issue in gloss) and to 
their expertise-backed judgments about the meaning of federal statutes (at 
issue in the administrative debate). But the Justices have not noticed this 
analogy. There is also a gap in the judicial treatment of these similar species 
 
 60 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790), reprinted in THE 
PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 416, 456–57 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999). Although the Court has not 
described gloss in Burkean terms, in the leading scholarly piece on Burkean jurisprudence, Professor 
Cass Sunstein characterizes the Steel Seizure decision as a leading example of the genre. Cass R. 
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 & n.11 (2006). 
 61 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1211–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Decker v. Nw. 
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615–16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (Justice Alito joining); id. 
at 616–21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 62 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“These cases bring 
into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to 
countenance in the name of Chevron deference.”). 
 63 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149, 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 64 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding especially “troubling” the 
“reflexive deference exhibited” to “an agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions that 
concern the scope of its own authority”). 
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of expertise-backed judgment. I flag this gap here because it opens up a 
productive line of inquiry in respect to Fourth Amendment gloss: Should 
nonjudicial actors’ expertise-backed views of the prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures receive the same deference as judgments 
on the separation of power, or is it more akin to judgments about statutes? 
And should the concerns about concentrated power bear upon the scope of 
Fourth Amendment gloss? Analogies across doctrinal boundaries make 
either a positive or a negative answer possible. 
A third way that historical gloss may be justified is in terms of 
settlement rather than wisdom. Where a practice has emerged as a stable 
equilibrium solution to constitutional ambiguity, the very fact of its stability 
over time may be sufficient to attract normative freight. Even if it is possible 
to imagine a better equilibrium, historical practice may warrant courts’ 
respect simply because it comports with all relevant actors’ settled 
expectations. In consequence, any move to a new equilibrium would 
necessarily be costly. When official actors “settle[] upon an institutional 
arrangement that they both deem desirable or at least practically workable 
and acceptable,” the bare fact of functionality may suffice to trigger judicial 
respect.65 
Justice Frankfurter offered an earlier example of gloss as settlement in 
his Steel Seizure concurrence when he discussed United States v. Midwest 
Oil Co.,66 a case concerning presidential withdrawals of public land from the 
real estate market.67 The Midwest Oil Court, explained Justice Frankfurter, 
had authorized a practice that extended “over a period of 80 years and in 252 
instances, and by Presidents learned and unlearned in the law.”68 Justice 
Frankfurter here is plainly not leaning on the considered legal judgment of 
past chief executives. Rather, the legal force of gloss in Midwest Oil derived 
from the sheer persistence in time and frequency of the practice. More 
recently, a majority of the Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning endorsed the 
President’s use of the recess appointment power to fill vacancies arising 
before a Senate recess out of a concern that “upset[ting] this traditional 
practice . . . would seriously shrink the authority that Presidents have 
believed existed and have exercised for so long.”69 
The settlement justification can be formulated another way by drawing 
upon the positive political theory literature on constitutions as focal points. 
 
 65 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24, at 434. 
 66 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 611 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)). 
 67 236 U.S. at 461. 
 68 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 611 (emphasis added). 
 69 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2573 (2014). 
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Economists have observed that in situations with multiple potential 
equilibrium solutions, “players [can] still ‘know’ what to do” based on 
“knowledge . . . from both directly relevant past experience and a sense of 
how individuals act generally.”70 That is, they have an exogenously supplied 
“focal point.” The theory of focal points is relevant here because one 
important function of written constitutions is to provide a “crisp focal point” 
for citizens concerned specifically about government overreaching or 
illegality.71 Like a proverbial red line, the focal point supplies “diffuse social 
and political actors with a coordinating signal that [constitutional] norms are 
imperiled.”72 A focal point account helps explain why it makes sense for 
courts to transform inchoate and atextual understandings shared by political 
actors into hard-edged, textually precise legal rules. Such a transformation 
leverages the “expressive power a third party wields when he declares to 
disputants how they should resolve their dispute.”73 The court, acting as that 
third party, reduces uncertainty and elicits legal compliance and 
predictability by reducing what had previously been an understanding “in the 
air” to one that can easily be consulted and verified—i.e., a focal point. This 
interpretation of the settlement justification looks at the manner in which a 
rule can facilitate coordination among citizens. It is in this regard that it is 
subtly distinct from the version of the settlement justification that looks at 
whether a practice has become settled among officials. 
The settlement justification (in either of its two flavors) is subtly 
different from its acquiescence and Burkean confreres. It is less dependent 
on the fact of officials’ agreement and so less sensitive to the prospect of 
protest, explicit or implicit, against an official position on the scope of legal 
powers. Further, whereas the argument from Burkean wisdom would seem 
to demand some durable pattern of behavior to draw an inference of wisdom 
accrued, the argument for settlement might be predicated on a briefer span 
of conduct. Something can serve as a focal point, that is, even if it has not 
been implemented iteratively over a long time. The settlement justification, 
therefore, may be the least profound and the most instrumental of all three 
theoretical grounds for gloss. 
 
 70 DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 101 (1990). The seminal discussion 
of focal points is THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–58 (1960). 
 71 Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose A Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 
119 (2018); see also Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of 
Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 246 (1997) (developing a formal model of focal points). 
 72 Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 71, at 110. 
 73 Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 
1048. 
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II. THE VARIETIES OF FOURTH AMENDMENT GLOSS 
I turn now from the justifications for gloss to the ways in which gloss 
is employed in the Fourth Amendment context. There are three categories of 
usage that describe how gloss is used in search and seizure law: gloss as 
substantive content, gloss as benchmark, and gloss as substitute. (A 
caution—these categories do not map neatly onto the three justifications for 
gloss described in Part I. Uses and justifications are subtly different matters.) 
Fourth Amendment gloss emerges at distinct points of an elaborate 
jurisprudential terrain. Thus, to understand the role of gloss, it is useful to 
begin by mapping the terrain in which its use arises and identifying what 
kind of Fourth Amendment questions it illuminates. Fourth Amendment 
analysis has three steps.74 First, a court must determine whether a particular 
state action is a “search” or “seizure.”75 
Second, assuming that the state action is a search or seizure such that 
the Fourth Amendment is even triggered, then there is a question of what 
follows procedurally from that determination. At this stage, the court must 
determine what quantum of suspicion the state must demonstrate to justify 
its intrusion. This step hinges on the Fourth Amendment’s text, which 
consists of two grammatically disjunctive clauses: the first talks of 
“warrants” and the second disavows “unreasonable” searches and seizures. 
Recently, the Court has embraced an open-textured reasonableness standard, 
the demands of which depend on the severity of the intrusion.76 Thus in 
practice, courts can impose a range of different procedural rules on different 
types of intrusions, from a warrant based on probable cause for the most 
intrusive to no justification at all for the least. This range is illustrated in 
microcosm by the Court’s treatment of searches incident to arrest. For most 
objects, a lawful arrest triggers authority to search without any warrant or 
quantum of suspicion.77 But for the data contained within cell phones, it 
displaces neither the warrant nor the probable cause requirement.78 
 
 74 Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
591, 610 (2016) (“The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures can 
be divided into three questions . . . .”). 
 75 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (considering whether 
acquisition of cell-site locational data from a third-party data provider constitutes a “search”). 
 76 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994) 
(noting that a judge must consider the “Amendment’s words and take them seriously: they do not 
require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion of evidence, but they do require that all searches and 
seizures be reasonable”). 
 77 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (“[A] search incident to a lawful arrest 
is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 78 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (“Our answer to the question of what police 
must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a 
warrant.”). 
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Finally, if a court has found that an official has executed an 
unreasonable search or seizure, it must determine whether a remedy, in the 
form of damages in the civil context or exclusion of the evidence obtained 
in the criminal context, is warranted. In both contexts, the Court has 
fashioned screening rules that preclude remediation absent a showing of 
“fault” on the part of the state official.79 In the damages context, this is a 
function of qualified immunity.80 In the suppression context, it follows from 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.81 
Where in this complex structure does the Court inject official practice 
as a source of law? Gloss is generally not invoked to ascertain what counts 
as a search or seizure. The most common invocation of gloss instead occurs 
at the second stage, when a court considers what kind of process officials 
must follow to justify an intrusion. As noted above, the Court has repeatedly 
framed this inquiry in terms of “reasonableness.”82 At one point, the Justices 
equated reasonableness with a presumptive warrant requirement.83 
Subsequently, the Court stated that “reasonableness” would be glossed in 
terms of the common law circa 1791.84 But this “originalist” analysis—
which I shall explore in more detail momentarily—proved insufficient,85 
leaving room for an inquiry into gloss.86 The final use of “gloss as substitute” 
 
 79 Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1547–50 (2018); 
see also Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on 
Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United States, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 237–39 (discussing 
convergence in these two lines of Fourth Amendment remedies). 
 80 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967). 
 81 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924–25 (1984); id. at 906 (defining the exclusionary rule 
as “precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of [the Fourth Amendment’s] commands”). 
 82 See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (“[R]easonableness 
is always the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis . . . .” (quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota, 
136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016))); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ . . . .”). 
 83 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 559 
(1999) (“For most of [the twentieth] century, the Supreme Court has endorsed what is now called 
the ‘warrant-preference’ construction of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in which the use of a 
valid warrant . . . is the salient factor in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”). 
 84 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation 
of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2011))); see also 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (“In determining whether a particular 
governmental action violates [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the action was 
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was 
framed.”). 
 85 See Sklansky, supra note 20, at 1762–70 (developing powerful criticisms of the originalist 
approach). 
 86 On the wide and varied use of the term “reasonableness” across heterogeneous fields of law, 
see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness in and out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 
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occurs in the third, remedial step of the Fourth Amendment inquiry, where 
it supplies a reason to deny remedies. 
It is worth pausing here to clarify the distinction between Fourth 
Amendment gloss and the Court’s use of eighteenth-century common law. 
These appeals to authority are distinct, although both partially look at official 
behavior. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court began invoking with increasing 
frequency the notion that “the common law when the Amendment was 
framed” was a reference point for reasonableness.87 For instance, the Court 
looked to common law trespass to determine whether the placement of a GPS 
device on the chassis of a vehicle was a “search.”88 Building on this 
precedent, Justice Clarence Thomas recently invoked the “common law” as 
a basis for condemning the exclusionary rule.89 These arguments are 
methodologically distinct from gloss arguments. Rather than looking to what 
state officials do, they focus on the content of the law. No question of 
acquiescence or the duration of behavior arises. Moreover, rather than 
ranging across time, these common law cases train resolutely on the 1790s.90 
Finally, common law originalism remains at best an occasional touchstone 
in Fourth Amendment cases. The recent Carpenter decision, holding that 
acquisition of cell-site locational data from telephone providers constituted 
a search, did not even attempt to find analogies in eighteenth-century tort or 
contract law.91 Gloss, by contrast, is far more pervasive. 
With this analytic foundation in place, I now turn to the three ways in 
which courts deploy gloss in Fourth Amendment arguments: as substantive 
content, as benchmark, and as substitute. 
A. Gloss as Substantive Content 
Of the three varietals of gloss in the search and seizure context, by far 
the most prevalent is the first. Gloss is used quite simply to define the content 
 
2135 (2015) (“The range of uses of ‘reasonableness’ in law is so great that a list is not an efficient 
way to describe and demarcate it.”). 
 87 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299; accord Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999); Wilson v. 
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). 
 88 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 89 Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1677 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that “the 
common law sometimes reflected the inverse of the exclusionary rule” as a ground for abandoning 
the latter). 
 90 See Sklansky, supra note 20, at 1743 (describing the common law approach as “reading 
eighteenth-century common law into the Fourth Amendment”). The criticisms of the common law 
method that Professor Sklansky develops, therefore, do not translate to the Fourth Amendment gloss 
context. Id. at 1762–70. 
 91 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214–15 (2018) (describing the question 
presented as standing at “the intersection of two lines of cases, both of which inform our 
understanding of the privacy interests at stake”). 
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of the constitutional rule—or, more accurately, to define one element of the 
constitutional regime. That is, rather than measure observed official conduct 
against an extrinsic legal benchmark, the Court has endogenized the 
constitutional rule—which defines the minimum procedural obligations of 
officials regulated by the Fourth Amendment—to what officials do. In a 
variant of this approach, it has also looked at the absence of a state practice 
as dispositive of the constitutional rule. I consider each of these possibilities 
in turn. 
1. The Affirmative Use of State Practice 
Perhaps the apogee of gloss as substantive content is the Court’s 2001 
decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, which authorized an arrest pursuant 
to a misdemeanor traffic offense that did not itself allow jail time.92 Justice 
David Souter’s majority opinion invoked a historical narrative that began 
with “pre-founding English common law,” including “divers Statutes” from 
the 1285 Statute of Winchester onward, to “the historical record as it has 
unfolded since the framing.”93 In the modern era, Justice Souter cited treaties 
published between 1884 and 1967 and also appealed to “statutes in all 50 
States and the District of Columbia [that] permit warrantless misdemeanor 
arrests,” as well as “a host of congressional enactments” that do the same.94 
Atwater thus developed a historical gloss argument that transcended 
common law arguments, extending both backward and forward in time. 
Proof of this extended historical arc served to demonstrate that arrests for 
misdemeanors that did not authorize jail time were “reasonable” under the 
Fourth Amendment by repudiating the petitioner’s contention that such 
arrests had never been allowed. The Court found not only that such arrests 
had always been allowed but that this practice proved their reasonableness. 
Twenty-five years earlier, the same joint appeal to a common law 
history and parallel contemporary practice characterized Justice Byron 
White’s majority opinion in United States v. Watson affirming “the ancient 
common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest . . . for a 
misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not 
committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the 
arrest.”95 As in Atwater, the Court in Watson took pains to underscore the 
persistence of the common law rule, which remained “substantially intact” 
 
 92 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001). The relevant Texas law at issue in Atwater was a misdemeanor 
offense “punishable by a fine not less than $25 or more than $50.” Id. (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE 
ANN. § 545.413(d) (West 1999)). The same statute, however, also authorized officers to make arrests 
for violations. Id. (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 543.001 (West 1995)). 
 93 Id. at 327–40. 
 94 Id. at 343–44. 
 95 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976). 
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until the time of the decision.96 Justice White cited the American Law 
Institute’s proposed (but not enacted at the time) Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure and federal statutes as evidence of “the judgment of 
the Nation and Congress . . . to authorize warrantless public arrests on 
probable cause.”97 Watson nicely illustrates the oddness of the gloss 
approach. The Court explicitly cited the very existence of the practice 
challenged on constitutional grounds as evidence of its constitutionality. 
The fraught and complex domain of automobile searches provides a 
third illustration of gloss as substantive content. Traffic stops made up 42% 
of all police–citizen interactions in 2011 (the last year for which data is 
available at the time of this writing), and roughly 26.4 million persons age 
sixteen or older indicated that their last contact with police occurred during 
a traffic stop.98 Hence, gloss has far-reaching consequences for many 
individuals, since it regulates their modal interactions with police. 
In the Court’s first encounter with searches of automobiles, Carroll v. 
United States, the Justices relied on gloss to define the procedural requisites 
of such searches to render the warrant requirement unnecessary.99 Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice William Howard Taft began by invoking 
customs statutes enacted “contemporaneously with the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment.”100 But, as in Atwater and Watson, the Court was at 
pains to show that the practice extended into the contemporary period, citing 
a 1917 federal statute and an 1899 Alaska statute that allowed for warrantless 
vehicular searches to demonstrate that the norm was unbroken “practically 
since the beginning of the Government.”101 Obviously, the references to these 
later statutes cannot be explained in terms of common law originalism. 
Carroll’s account of continuity contrasted with contemporaneous 
federal courts’ conclusion that the Eighteenth Amendment ruptured the 
constitutional fabric and so necessitated a rethinking of the Fourth 
Amendment’s constraints on vehicular searches.102 Those courts were also 
 
 96 Id. at 421–22. 
 97 Id. at 422–23. 
 98 Traffic Stops, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?tid= 
702&ty=tp [https://perma.cc/G3BU-BU7Y]. 
 99 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 100 Id. at 150–51 (citing a 1789 statute permitting the search of “any ship or vessel” in relation 
to customs violations). 
 101 Id. at 152–53. 
 102 See, e.g., United States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231, 234 (S.D. Cal. 1922) (arguing that “the 
Eighteenth Amendment would have been stillborn” had warrantless vehicular searches been barred). 
This was not the only reason for concern about automobiles. Sarah A. Seo, The New Public, 
125 YALE L.J. 1616, 1635 (2016) (documenting judicial anxieties about automobiles’ riskiness to 
the general public in the 1920s). 
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surely cognizant of the dramatic increase in automotive usage in the 1910s.103 
At least for Chief Justice Taft, however, Prohibition and the rise of 
automobile usage did not change the analysis. In his private correspondence, 
Chief Justice Taft stressed a quite different instrumental justification for the 
result in Carroll. The automobile, he noted, was “the greatest instrument for 
promoting immunity of crimes of violence that I know of in the history of 
civilization.”104 The Court’s subsequent decisions endorsed and enlarged the 
Carroll rule to encompass containers found in a vehicle. They again stressed 
the historical continuity of vehicle-related searches and the absence of 
legitimate reliance interests on the part of drivers.105 The amalgam of 
eighteenth-century common law and post-ratification gloss thus proved a 
durable foundation for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
Finally, a variant on gloss as substantive content is the possibility of 
looking to legislative action as a source of Fourth Amendment meaning. In 
two recent cases concerning new technologies of locational tracking and cell 
phone data, Justice Alito suggested that the Court should attend—and even 
pay heightened deference—to legislative judgments on the Fourth 
 
 103 Between 1910 and 1924, the number of registered passenger automobiles in the United States 
increased from 500,000 to 15,500,000. ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A 
STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE 253 n.3 (1929). 
 104 Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative 
State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 125 n.408 (2006). Historian 
Sarah Seo argues that a shift did occur in suspects’ ability to evade arrest as a consequence of 
automobiles’ mass availability. Before 1913, when mass production of vehicles took off, “[i]f a law 
officer had reason to believe that a suspect was skipping town or fleeing with a cargo of illegal or 
stolen goods, he usually had ample time to obtain a warrant for search and arrest”—an impossibility 
once flight by automobile became available. Sarah A. Seo, Antinomies and the Automobile: A New 
Approach to Criminal Justice Histories, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1020, 1031 (2013). 
 105 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (finding “no legitimate reliance interest” 
and noting that “the rule we apply in this case is faithful to the interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment that the Court has followed with substantial consistency throughout our history”); id. at 
820 n.26 (“During virtually the entire history of our country—whether contraband was transported 
in a horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern automobile—it has been assumed that a 
lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that might conceal the object of 
the search.”); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (noting the same rationale). In 
another line of cases, the Court has relied on the sheer frequency of police contact with automobiles 
as a justification for permitting warrantless searches. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 
(1973) (“As a result of our federal system of government, however, state and local police officers, 
unlike federal officers, have much more contact with vehicles for reasons related to the operation of 
vehicles themselves.”). While largely a decision based on the eighteenth-century common law, 
Wyoming v. Houghton contains a brief reference to post-ratification “practice under [customs] 
statutes.” 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999). I do not think this is enough to rank it as a gloss case. The 
Court’s most recent decision on the automobile exception does not dwell on historical continuity. 
See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669 (2018) (identifying two policy justifications for 
warrantless automobile searches). Since those two justifications were found not to apply to the facts 
of the case, whereas the historical basis for the rule would have applied, it should perhaps be 
unsurprising that Collins was the rare automobile case in which the defendant prevailed. 
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Amendment’s implementation.106 There is no logical reason this analytic 
frame should be limited to new enactments. If legislation has already created 
a basis for stable practice, Justice Alito’s reasoning would suggest deference. 
There are, however, few federal enactments regulating searches and seizures 
outside the context of electronic communications107 and national security.108 
The former, however, is a response to a Supreme Court decision (albeit one 
that supplements its response with a good deal more regulatory detail),109 
while the latter is rarely subject to challenge. Nevertheless, Justice Alito’s 
suggestions are a useful reminder that a gloss argument need not be cabined 
to executive officials. It can also encompass legislative actors. 
Across all these cases, the Court treated the Fourth Amendment’s 
procedural element as endogenous to—indeed, as derivative of—the current 
and historical practice of police. It leaned heavily on gloss, particularly in 
practically significant cases, such as those involving vehicular stops and 
misdemeanor arrests. Indeed, in the absence of gloss as substantive content, 
it seems plausible to think that Fourth Amendment law on the ground today 
would look very different. 
2. The Absence of Gloss as the Absence of Constitutional Authority 
In the jurisprudence of structural constitutionalism, the absence of 
historical precedent can serve as a predicate for finding that an official 
practice falls outside constitutional bounds. The starkest example of this 
reasoning, as noted, occurs in the federalism jurisprudence of anti-
 
 106 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“I would reconsider 
the question presented here if either Congress or state legislatures, after assessing the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement and the privacy interests of cell phone owners, enact legislation that draws 
reasonable distinctions based on categories of information or perhaps other variables.”); United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances involving 
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”). Justice 
Alito cited an important article by Professor Orin Kerr on institutional competence and technological 
change in the Fourth Amendment domain. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) 
[hereinafter Kerr, Constitutional Myths] (“[C]ourts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of 
judicial caution when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide the 
primary rules governing law enforcement investigations involving new technologies.”). Professor 
Kerr himself has subsequently taken a different tack. Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2017) (“Structural differences 
between the Fourth Amendment and investigative legislation make legislation a poor signal of 
constitutionally relevant judgments.”). 
 107 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012) (governing electronic surveillance during ordinary 
criminal investigations). 
 108 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 105(a)(2)(A), 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012) (regarding the “electronic surveillance [of] a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power”). 
 109 Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 106, at 847–51 (describing the legislative history of 
the Wiretapping Act). 
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commandeering.110 A similar analytic move is found in Fourth Amendment 
cases, where the absence of a practice is taken as evidence that the practice 
is not constitutional. 
The absence of gloss was central in the Court’s very first landmark 
Fourth Amendment decision, the 1886 judgment in Boyd v. United States.111 
Boyd arose out of a seizure of goods alleged to have been imported without 
payment of duties.112 Exercising an authority first granted by a June 1874 
federal statute, the U.S. Attorney had demanded that the importer (Boyd) 
produce certain invoices at peril of having the facts at issue in the case found 
against him.113 The Court held that this “compulsory production of a man’s 
private papers . . . to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.”114 As in other “gloss as substantive content” cases, the Boyd 
Court relied on both “[t]he views of the first Congress”115 and subsequent 
practice—or rather the lack thereof. Specifically, the Boyd Court observed 
that the statutory authority at issue “was the first legislation of the kind that 
ever appeared on the statute book of the United States, . . . as seen from its 
date.”116 The Court further stressed the “total unlikeness” of the 1874 
provisions to any earlier customs-related legislation.117 In these passages, 
Boyd can be fairly read to say that the shape of governmental practice in the 
past determines the boundaries of present legal authority: Absence begets 
absence, just as usage begets authority. Boyd’s logic is therefore the inverse 
of precedent such as Atwater, Watson, and Carroll. 
More recently, the absence of analogous historical practice has played 
a role in decisions concerning the interaction of new technologies with the 
Fourth Amendment. Recall that in United States v. Jones, a unanimous Court 
held that the placement of a GPS device on the undercarriage of a suspect’s 
vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.118 (Jones, I note, 
is the rare case in which gloss played a role in defining the threshold scope 
of the Fourth Amendment’s operation.) The majority opinion by Justice 
Scalia noted, and the concurring opinion of Justice Alito underscored, the 
 
 110 See supra text accompanying notes 33–35; see also, e.g., New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992). 
 111 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 112 Id. at 617–18. 
 113 Id. at 619–20. 
 114 Id. at 622, 630. The Court also noted that the Fifth Amendment applied. Id. at 630. 
 115 Id. at 630. 
 116 Id. at 621. The Court further observed that this was a moment “of great national excitement, 
when the powers of the government were subjected to a severe strain to protect the national 
existence.” Id. 
 117 Id. at 624. 
 118 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). 
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disanalogy between the kinds of surveillance available to the police during 
earlier periods of American history and GPS vehicular tracking.119 Two years 
later, in Riley v. California, the Court held that a warrant was required to 
search a cell phone’s contents even when police had acquired it pursuant to 
a search incident to arrest.120 Again, the Court underscored the disjunction 
between the kind of evidence that might have been found on a suspect’s 
person in the past and the data accessible via a cell phone.121 Equating the 
two was “like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from 
a flight to the moon.”122 In both Jones and Riley, the Court thus pointed to 
the absence of any analogous historical practice as a reason for tougher 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 
But technological leaps do not always defeat arguments from gloss. In 
Maryland v. King, the Court held that taking a buccal swab for DNA during 
an arrest and using that DNA to match the suspect to evidence from older 
“cold” cases was reasonable.123 The Court drew an analogy between DNA 
identification and the practice of fingerprinting all suspects that developed 
in “the middle of the 20th century.”124 It reasoned that because DNA 
identification was merely “an advanced technique superior to fingerprinting 
in many ways,” it “would make little sense to either the forensic expert or a 
layperson” to distinguish them for Fourth Amendment purposes.125 The 
practical continuity between different means of suspect identification, the 
Court reasoned, vouchsafed the legality of DNA testing despite 
technological change.126 
Uniting the lines of cases described in the last two Sections is the 
Court’s attention to durable historical practice as a touchstone for 
determining which police practices count as “reasonable.” History can play 
 
 119 Id. at 406 n.3 (discussing the analogy between a constable concealing himself in a coach in 
the eighteenth century and twenty-first-century GPS tracking); id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (same). 
 120 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
 121 Id. at 2488–89 (“Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those 
implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”). 
 122 Id. at 2488. 
 123 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013) (affirming reasonableness as the touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 124 Id. at 459. 
 125 Id. Underscoring the importance of continuity over time, the Court further rejected the 
defendant’s argument that DNA identification took far longer than fingerprinting by looking forward 
in time to new technologies that would expedite genetic testing. Id. at 460. 
 126 The analogy is problematic, however, insofar as few attempts have been made to empirically 
confirm the predicate assumption of individual uniqueness that animates fingerprinting or to 
examine error rates. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic 
Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 894 (2005). That is, the historical practice on which the 
King Court hung its hat may be problematically error-prone. 
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both a positive and a negative role for the Court: it can authorize as much as 
it can undermine the state’s claim to power. It makes sense, therefore, to treat 
these two lines of cases under the same analytic rubric because history is 
playing the same function in both, albeit with different valences. 
B. Gloss as Benchmark 
A further, distinct judicial use of state practice is as a benchmarking 
source of “best practices.” By examining variation in the policing and 
prosecutorial practices of different jurisdictions, the Court can draw 
inferences about whether a challenged state action is necessary to achieve 
public order and safety. The distinctive trait of gloss as benchmark is 
interjurisdictional comparison. Gloss as benchmark does not have an easy 
parallel in other domains of constitutional law, but it does resemble the 
practice of “norming” in administrative law. According to Professors 
Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner, an agency engaged in norming picks “a 
level of strictness that puts significant burdens on industry outliers—the 
firms with the worst practices—while putting limited burdens or none at all 
to the firms whose practices are of average quality or better”; as a result, the 
“actual practices of industries” provide a measure of “the regulatory 
standard.”127 
Perhaps the most practically important use of gloss as benchmark arose 
in a case about remedies rather than the meaning of “reasonableness”—the 
1961 landmark decision in Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the exclusionary 
rule to the states.128 An exclusionary rule remedy for Fourth Amendment 
violations had been obtained in federal court since 1914,129 but when the 
Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states in 1949, it 
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to state criminal trials.130 Mapp, 
therefore, did not need to explain why the exclusionary rule was warranted. 
Rather, the Court faced the problem of explaining why the factual landscape 
had changed since 1949 so as to legitimate the expansion of the Fourth 
Amendment to state courts. 
Pivotal to the majority’s explanation was a benchmarking argument 
drawing on federal practice. Citing a speech by none other than FBI Director 
J. Edgar Hoover, the Mapp Court pointedly observed that “it has not been 
suggested either that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has . . . been 
 
 127 Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Norming in Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3132881 [https://perma.cc/S38N-7G8D]. 
 128 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). 
 129 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 130 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1949). 
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rendered ineffective” by the imposition of the exclusionary rule in federal 
prosecutions.131 Moreover, the Court pointed to its abrogation of the “silver 
platter” doctrine, which had allowed federal officials to share unlawfully 
secured information with state counterparts for introduction into a state 
tribunal.132 Again, the Court suggested that expanding the exclusionary rule 
in this fashion had not compromised law enforcement. Ordinary policing, the 
Court implied, not only could coexist happily with the exclusionary rule but 
already did so without sacrificing public safety to any palpable degree. 
A second use of gloss as benchmarking is found in the Court’s 
consideration of deadly police force as a form of “seizure.” In Tennessee v. 
Garner, the Court held that “[deadly] force may not be used unless it is 
necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe 
that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury 
to the officer or others.”133 Garner framed the question of whether deadly 
force could be employed in terms of “balancing” the suspect’s interest in 
staying alive against the state’s interest in public order and safety.134 To 
evaluate the state’s interests, Justice White’s majority opinion recognized the 
“fact . . . that a majority of police departments in this country have forbidden 
the use of deadly force against nonviolent suspects.”135 
Garner is notable for the level of detail with which the Court conducted 
this inquiry. The Court reviewed policies adopted by both states and the 
federal government, it considered requirements for accreditation by the 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, and it 
discussed an empirical study by the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police.136 It further cited an amicus brief joined by the Police Foundation, 
nine national and international associations of police and criminal justice 
professionals, the chiefs of police associations of two states, and thirty-one 
law enforcement chief executives—all of whom attested to deadly force’s 
inefficacy in practice.137 This corpus of evidence about actual practice 
permitted the Court to reason that “[i]f those charged with the enforcement 
of the criminal law have abjured the use of deadly force in arresting 
 
 131 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (footnote omitted) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
218 (1960)). 
 132 Id. at 653. 
 133 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 
 134 Id. at 7–8 (explaining that the Court, by “balancing the extent of the intrusion against the 
need for it, has examined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is 
conducted”). 
 135 Id. at 10–11. 
 136 Id. at 18. 
 137 Id. at 19; see also Brief for the Police Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the 
Respondent-Appellee at 27–40, Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (Nos. 83-1035, 83-1070), 1984 WL 566025. 
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nondangerous felons, there is a substantial basis for doubting that the use of 
such force is an essential attribute of the arrest power in all felony cases.”138 
In effect, the Court surveyed the field of policing practices and determined 
that Tennessee was an outlier whose practices warranted no respect.139 
A third, more recent example of gloss as benchmark can be found in the 
recent decision excluding cell-phone contents from the scope of warrantless 
searches incident to arrest.140 In Riley v. California, the Court sought to 
respond to the concern that an arrestee’s cell phone might pose a risk to 
officer safety because it could be used to alert compatriots in crime.141 As in 
Garner, the Court again engaged in a comparative analysis of policing 
practices. It discerned “a number of law enforcement agencies around the 
country [that] already encourage the use of Faraday bags,” aluminum bags 
(akin to sandwich wrapping) that can simply and quickly be used to isolate 
a phone.142 The Riley Court could have made this point without 
benchmarking, yet it felt compelled to go beyond its bare intuition to make 
a comparative argument—which itself is a telling sign of the importance of 
gloss in the Fourth Amendment context. 
Finally, gloss as benchmark can be fleetingly glimpsed in the related 
jurisprudence of street stops. The landmark Terry v. Ohio opinion—holding 
that investigative stops are permitted on a showing of reasonable articulable 
suspicion—turned largely on the pragmatic need for such stops.143 Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, however, noted that street stops were a kind of “swift 
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the 
beat—which historically has not been . . . subjected to the warrant 
procedure.”144 This suggests at least awareness of historical practice. 
More interestingly, the Court’s resolution of the case—splitting the 
victory by allowing investigative stops without probable cause while still 
requiring the lower reasonable articulable suspicion standard—was 
anticipated by an amicus brief submitted by the National District Attorneys 
 
 138 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
 139 Garner, though, is an outlier in its comparative method in this area of Fourth Amendment 
law. Subsequent decisions offered more inchoate and ambiguous formulations of the relevant legal 
rule, such that in general police are not “on notice of whether a particular use of force is 
constitutional.” Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 
1143 (2008) (developing an extensive critique of the doctrine’s underspecification). 
 140 The leading case for the doctrine more generally is Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–
63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person 
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or 
effect his escape.”). 
 141 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
 142 Id. at 2487. 
 143 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 144 Id. at 20. 
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Association (NDAA).145 The NDAA recommended the Court follow 
California’s recently adopted rule, which turned upon whether “a reasonable 
man” would believe, based on the “circumstances,” that a stop was 
“‘necessary to proper discharge’ of an officer’s duties.”146 Because Chief 
Justice Warren did not cite the NDAA brief, it is impossible to be certain that 
Terry in fact relied on this benchmark. But its presence in the briefing is 
evidence that the Court could have inferred the absence of a compelling 
need for police power to make stops without any level of suspicion by 
reference to California’s practice.147 
As I have described it, gloss as benchmarking is a varied phenomenon. 
On the one hand, Mapp and Garner invalidate practices in what Professor 
Justin Driver calls “holdout” jurisdictions.148 The states chastised by those 
decisions were laggards in relation to an otherwise uniform trend of 
increasing professionalization and sophistication in police practices.149 In 
contrast, Riley and Terry rest on comparisons between jurisdictions but do 
not suggest that the favored states are a majority or follow a dominant 
practice. The logic of Riley and Terry is not the logic of holdouts but is rather 
more akin to a search for what environmental law calls the “best available 
technology.”150 In short, gloss as benchmarking can have both a diachronic 
(development) and a synchronic form, depending on the set of comparators 
used. 
C. Gloss as Substitute 
Finally, gloss might be employed as a substitute for constitutional 
protection. More specifically, the Court’s belief that officials generally 
engage in certain rights-protecting practices can support the conclusion that 
the imposition of consequences for a Fourth Amendment violation—
typically, the suppression of inculpatory evidence—is unjustified. This is an 
argument offered at the third and, also, final stage of Fourth Amendment 
 
 145 RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE 
MAKING OF THE 1960S, at 206 (Oxford Univ. Press 2016). 
 146 Id. (citing Brief of National District Attorneys Association, Amicus Curiae, in Support of 
Respondent at 35, Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (No. 67), 1967 WL 113688). 
 147 For a similar argument of practicality from observed policing practices, see, for example, 
Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 873–74 (2014), discussing the practicality 
of administering warnings during automobile stops by drawing on training manuals and state 
practice. 
 148 Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 937 (2014) (“An outlier that is 
a holdout involves a state law or practice that, although perhaps once prevalent, has now receded 
and exists in, at most, a few remaining jurisdictions.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 149 Id. at 952 (describing the elimination of holdouts as “extinguishing practices that time has 
left behind”). 
 150 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
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analysis, where the question is whether exclusion is warranted. But the 
elimination of the exclusionary rule means there is no meaningful way to 
enforce the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. For where there 
is no exclusionary remedy, but where state law still requires a warrant, 
empirical studies suggest that police “pretty much completely ignored the 
warrant requirement.”151 Gloss as substitute, in short, has powerful practical 
repercussions for legal compliance. 
This deployment of gloss arises in case law extending and amplifying 
the Court’s 1984 decision in United States v. Leon, which had fashioned a 
“good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule for “searches conducted 
pursuant to warrants.”152 Leon’s exception initially applied only to searches 
based on warrants that were erroneously issued by a magistrate, unless it was 
“‘entirely unreasonable’ for an officer to believe, in the particular 
circumstances of this case, that there was probable cause.”153 But Leon has 
subsequently been extended piecemeal to cover a far larger fraction of 
unlawful searches.154 It is here that gloss has played a major role. 
Two extrusions of Leon rely on gloss as substitute. First, in Hudson v. 
Michigan, the Court considered and rejected exclusion as a remedy for 
violations of the “knock and announce” rule, which requires officers to 
knock before entering a home to execute a warrant.155 Explaining this 
remedial rationing, Justice Scalia pointed to what he called “the increasing 
professionalism of police forces” and to a “new emphasis on internal police 
discipline” as a result of “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, 
and supervision of police officers.”156 Given these changes in policing, 
Justice Scalia reasoned, “modern police forces are staffed with professionals; 
it is not credible to assert that internal discipline, which can limit successful 
careers, will not have a deterrent effect.”157 Unlike Garner, the Hudson Court 
did not rely on amicus briefing or empirical evidence of changed practices. 
Rather, it cited one historical source and several training manuals as evidence 
 
 151 David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 580 
(2008) (describing the experience of California, which requires a warrant for a search of garbage, 
but which has had no exclusionary rule since a 1982 referendum). For an early recognition of the 
remedial vacuum created by the good faith exception to suppression as a remedy, see Donald Dripps, 
Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 (1986) (“[T]he Leon majority has withdrawn that remedy 
in a class of cases for which no other remedy is available.”). 
 152 468 U.S. 897, 923–24 (1984). 
 153 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 549 (2012). 
 154 See Huq & Lakier, supra note 79, at 1550–51 (describing Leon’s expansion). 
 155 547 U.S. 586, 590–94 (2006). 
 156 Id. at 598–99 (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION 
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 51 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993)). 
 157 Id. at 599. 
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of a trend of increasing professionalization.158 It further assumed—without 
either anecdotal or quantitative evidence—that increasing 
professionalization necessarily translated into lower rates of Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
The second extension of Leon to rely on gloss as substitute is a touch 
more subtle. In Herring v. United States, the Court declined to require 
exclusion when a negligent record-keeping error led to a mistaken arrest, 
which in turn revealed contraband.159 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority 
opinion did not rely on gloss to reach the result that exclusion was “not worth 
the cost.”160 But the conclusion that negligent errors did not warrant 
deterrence through exclusion is hardly self-evident. To the contrary, it “flies 
squarely in the face of a host of legal frameworks that presume negligence 
to be amenable to deterrence—not the least of which is the predominant 
theory of tort remedies.”161 
As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg observed in her perceptive dissent, the 
best explanation for the Court’s odd assumption that negligence cannot be 
deterred through institution-wide policies or safeguards is the majority’s 
unstated premise that “police departments have become sufficiently 
‘professional’ that they do not need external deterrence to avoid Fourth 
Amendment violations.”162 The practice of professionalism, in short, was 
implicitly treated as a “substitute good for the exclusionary rule.”163 Hence, 
although Herring is not a case in which the Court leaned explicitly and 
heavily on gloss as substitute, the premise of professional police functioned 
as a necessary background assumption for a dialing back of the exclusionary 
rule. 
Developments in the practice of policing, in short, can obviate as well 
as extend the Fourth Amendment’s reach. By no measure is this development 
the only means of limiting constitutional protections. Justice Thomas, for 
example, has recently invoked formalist and originalist grounds to argue that 
the exclusionary rule should be abandoned in state courts164—a move that 
would effectively eliminate the Fourth Amendment as a practical 
consideration for most policing. If that were to happen, gloss would no 
 
 158 Id. at 598–99. 
 159 555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009). 
 160 Id. at 144 n.4. 
 161 Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 682–83 (2011) (“The Court’s assignment of a value of near-zero to the 
potential of deterring negligent police conduct amounts to an ipse dixit premise.”). 
 162 Herring, 555 U.S. at 156 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 163 Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 422 (2013). 
 164 Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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longer be the most consequential valve for adjusting the strength of the 
Fourth Amendment’s friction on official behavior. Until then, gloss is likely 
to be a consequential element of the Fourth Amendment’s remedial 
jurisprudence. 
D. Summarizing the Role of Gloss in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Judicial invocations of gloss pervade Fourth Amendment doctrine. Yet 
gloss has not yet been properly noticed or analyzed as a Fourth Amendment 
phenomenon. In my view, there are two reasons for this. First, a great deal 
of scholarly energy in the Fourth Amendment domain is concentrated on the 
question of what counts as a “search” such that constitutional protection is 
triggered.165 This threshold question attracts scholars because it is complex 
and elusive. Fourth Amendment law covers a wide and heterogeneous 
landscape of interactions between police and private individuals. The Court 
must formulate a rule that addresses chattels, real property, physical 
touching, electronic searches, communications acquisition, thermal scans, 
metadata acquisition, and more.166 The threshold rule must be alive to the 
broad array of individual interests in play and the many ways in which 
government can impinge on those interests. Given the theoretical and 
normative complexity of this task, it is no surprise scholars have found it so 
alluring. 
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to think that the definition of search and 
seizure exhausts the stock of important Fourth Amendment questions: The 
issues of what government action is “reasonable” and of what remedy 
attaches to a constitutional violation are in practice just as important. They 
are also just as pivotal to whether Fourth Amendment interests are 
vindicated. An excessive focus on the question of search—and a relative 
inattention to the legal infrastructure that follows—risks missing much that 
is of vital practical importance. 
Second, because gloss has three different strands and hence can be used 
to bolster or alternatively sap the strength of Fourth Amendment protections, 
it has no single normative valence. While gloss as content and gloss as 
 
 165 See supra note 18. 
 166 Another reason that the definition of “search” has received so much attention, in my view, is 
that it is the natural berth from which to consider questions of technology—which are of obvious 
and immediate interest to many. Yet it is a mistake to think about the interaction of technology and 
the Fourth Amendment in isolation. At a very minimum, a natural and perhaps inevitable response 
to greater judicial regulation of technologies such as cell-phone data and locational trackers is a more 
aggressive approach to searches and seizures of individuals in the real world. Carpenter, for 
example, creates an incentive for officials to seek consent to search suspects’ phones and to acquire 
historical locational data in at least some cases in which they otherwise would have approached a 
telecommunications company (even if this option is by no means always available). 
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substitute seem to have a generally statist orientation, the absence of gloss 
can undermine state power. Gloss as benchmark is also ambiguous. It was 
used to constrain state power in Garner but in Terry enabled more invasive 
interventions into urban life.167 As a result of this shifting valence, Justices 
of different ideological colors can invoke gloss to their own ends. In contrast, 
scholars who argue for either consistently broad or consistently narrow 
accounts of the Fourth Amendment cannot simply champion or condemn 
gloss. Lacking any simple ideological coding, gloss falls through the cracks. 
With that in mind, it has been my aim in this Part to offer a thick 
description of the major, if ignored, role that gloss has come to play in this 
area of constitutional law. Having installed that account, it is time to consider 
whether gloss’s outsized rule in the jurisprudence can be justified. 
III. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT GLOSS 
It is one thing to say that gloss is ubiquitous. It is another to say that its 
use is justified. The Supreme Court has said dismayingly little about the 
underlying legal and normative justifications for relying on gloss in the 
Fourth Amendment context. This Part therefore asks whether the grounds for 
gloss’s relevance that have been identified in the larger constitutional law 
literature—as acquiescence, Burkean wisdom, or settlement—provide 
normative ballast here. Working through each of the three possible grounds 
of justification that were identified in Part I, I suggest that there is only 
limited justification for the judicial use of gloss in the Fourth Amendment 
context. Indeed, application of constitutional law’s larger theoretical 
framework for the evaluation of gloss arguments provides reason to resist 
many of the ways in which the Court has come to rely upon official practice 
in the Fourth Amendment domain. If gloss’s use persists, therefore, it is 
likely not on any principled ground but rather as a function of considerations 
not directly tied to the values and goals of the Fourth Amendment itself. 
I examine in turn each of the three main justifications for giving weight 
to official practice or gloss in constitutional analysis. This assumes that the 
reasons for giving weight to gloss in the Fourth Amendment context are a 
subset of those the courts have for attributing significance to gloss more 
generally across constitutional law. Since the Court has never given bespoke 
reasons for Fourth Amendment gloss, this seems a reasonable assumption. 
Out of an abundance of caution, though, I have taken a capacious view of 
 
 167 Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a 
Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2429–40 (2017) (documenting costs of stop, 
question, and frisk programs and suggesting that these substantially outweigh the programs’ 
benefits). 
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each justification. This means casting a wide net to consider all possible 
grounds for relying upon official practice in the Fourth Amendment context. 
A. The Acquiescence Justification 
The acquiescence justification for gloss imagines a dialogic process 
between multiple institutional actors exercising coordinated constitutional 
powers in a context of dynamic and iterative interaction. Treating the 
resulting practice as gloss requires the assumption that those actors are 
themselves responsible for the constitutional judgments behind different 
policies. It also assumes a dialogic process in which the constitutionality of 
a practice is recognized, and thus legitimated, by a second actor. 
There is simply no good way to fit gloss into this dialogic model in the 
Fourth Amendment context. Fourth Amendment law is an interaction 
between courts and a highly diffuse and fragmented array of institutions—
police departments, magistrates, and federal investigative entities. State and 
local law enforcement agencies alone employed about 1,133,000 persons on 
a full-time basis in 2008.168 Those agencies, moreover, vary greatly in size 
and capacity.169 As a result, police practice is quite different from the fifty-
state practice recognized in Evenwel v. Abbott170—far too diffuse and 
heterogeneous to support facile generalizations about trends or consensus. 
Hence, the implicit dialogic process of acquiescence at work in the 
separation of powers context has no precise analog in the Fourth Amendment 
context. Further, there is no colorable argument that the diffuse aggregate of 
law enforcement bodies covered by the Fourth Amendment are engaged in 
collective or parallel constitutional judgments because they are coordinate 
departments that are coequal in authority to the judicial branch.171 The 
acquiescence justification, therefore, is poorly matched to the Fourth 
Amendment, whether gloss is being used as substantive content, benchmark, 
or substitute. 
The heterogeneity of policing raises particularly difficult questions 
about the manner in which the Court has enlarged the scope of the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. Recall that, in cases such as Hudson v. 
 
 168 BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF 
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 1 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCT7-LB9T]. 
 169 About half (49%) of all agencies employed fewer than ten full-time officers. Nearly two-thirds 
(64%) of sworn personnel worked for agencies that employed 100 or more officers. Id. 
 170 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); see supra text accompanying notes 37–38. 
 171 Can widely used policing manuals be used as evidence of acquiesced-to practice in the 
policing context? Cf. Stoughton, supra note 147, at 874–75; Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning 
Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1530–37 (2008) (discussing police training manuals’ instructions 
on interrogations and suggesting that those instructions influence practice on the ground). 
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Michigan172 and Herring v. United States,173 the Court predicated this 
expansion on a generalization about increasing levels of professionalism 
within police departments. But even within a given jurisdiction, it has long 
been known that the quality of policing delivered to different neighborhoods 
varies dramatically, often along racial or ethnic lines.174 Given 
intrajurisdictional disparities in service quality and given the likely 
exacerbation of such disparities across departments of different sizes, 
different sociopolitical environments, and different criminological 
conditions, generalizations about policing are difficult to draw. Hudson’s 
assertion that “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and 
supervision of police officers” resulted in “the increasing professionalism of 
police forces” is hard to substantiate.175 As I develop further below, the 
available empirical evidence suggests we should be very skeptical.176 
Worse, the Court’s good faith jurisprudence not only lacks a clear 
theoretical account of gloss but also has no stable empirical methodology to 
evaluate how to establish the veracity of a general descriptive claim about 
policing. Hence, the Court has no way to determine how many police 
departments fall at the lower end of the professionalism spectrum or to 
ascertain whether these departments are concentrated in impoverished or 
racially segregated communities (as is likely the case).177 Instead, cases such 
as Hudson and Herring manifest at best an indifference to the plight of 
communities that remain still burdened by suboptimal policing. 
Despite these limits to the application of the acquiescence justification 
here, there is a dialogic process of interbranch deliberation at work in Fourth 
Amendment law. But it is not one that supports an inference of gloss in any 
of the forms observed in the current case law—and it is one that undermines 
any further doctrinal accounting for other actors’ acquiescence. The Fourth 
 
 172 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 173 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 174 One of the first studies to show this was Kenneth R. Mladenka & Kim Quaile Hill, The 
Distribution of Urban Police Services, 40 J. POL. 112, 121–24 (1978). 
 175 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599 (quoting SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF 
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 51 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993)). 
 176 See infra text accompanying notes 220–250. 
 177 One measure of differences in quality is public trust in the police. Careful ecological studies 
find that “race remains a significant predictor of perceptions of unjust police practices, even after 
taking into account the ecological structuring of neighborhoods and their perceived environmental 
context.” John MacDonald et al., Race, Neighborhood Context and Perceptions of Injustice by the 
Police in Cincinnati, 44 URB. STUD. 2567, 2567–68 (2007); see also Elaine B. Sharp & Paul E. 
Johnson, Accounting for Variation in Distrust of Local Police, 26 JUST. Q. 157, 157–58 (2009) 
(finding racial differences after controlling for individual- and neighborhood-level explanations of 
trust in police). These studies suggest that differences in police quality disproportionately impact 
minority groups. Hudson and Herring, in this light, are, at a minimum, instances of judicial 
indifference to the state’s treatment of minorities. 
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Amendment already draws upon the substantive judgments of state and 
national legislatures to calibrate its protections because it implicitly relies on 
the substantive ambit of the criminal law.178 Definitions of probable cause 
and reasonable articulable suspicion, that is, already depend on the range of 
crimes that a legislature chooses to enact. Narrowing the scope of 
substantively criminal behavior makes it more difficult (all else being equal) 
for police to conduct searches and make seizures. For example, criminal 
conspiracies, even if they are costly to investigate and prosecute,179 may be 
a boon to police because their undemanding actus reus requirements make it 
easier to obtain a warrant or otherwise justify a search. The incorporation of 
substantive criminal law into the Fourth Amendment calculus means that 
legislators already have a say about the strength of constitutional 
protections. Hinging a judgment of what is reasonable on their acquiescence, 
therefore, is in effect a way of giving legislatures two bites at the Fourth 
Amendment apple. 
In recent decades, moreover, legislatures have not used their 
discretionary influence over Fourth Amendment law in a wise fashion, or in 
a way that furthers the Amendment’s normative goals. At the federal level, 
where the scope of criminal law is most closely studied, it is estimated that 
Congress adds about fifty new criminal statutes each year, without 
necessarily removing any old ones from the books.180 Crime rates have not 
followed the same steady upward path. Quite the contrary.181 Legislative 
acquiescence to increasing police power is thus not a rational response to 
changes in crime rates. Rather, it flows from a bidding war between political 
parties striving to compete for a punitive public’s affections.182 It seems no 
coincidence that public attitudes toward crime, and in particular the public’s 
 
 178 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 
802 (2006) (noting that constitutional law makes crime definition “politically easier” than other 
mechanisms for altering the nature and scope of the criminal justice process). 
 179 Cf. William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2028 (2008) 
(“[Conspiracy] crimes are more costly to investigate and prosecute than one-on-one criminal 
transactions . . . .”). 
 180 Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1198 
(2015). 
 181 Crime in the United States, 2014: Table 1, FBI: UCR, (Fall 2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-
in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/Q9TR-TMX8] (describing an 
overall decline in violent crimes—murder, rape robbery, aggravated assault—and nonviolent 
crimes—property crimes, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft—between 1995 and 2014). 
There is little correlation, however, between the rate of legislative supplementation of the criminal 
code and changes to the crime rate. This should not surprise: Most crime is likely to be of a familiar 
(and already prescribed) kind. By and large, new criminal offenses are not likely to influence such 
behavior. 
 182 For a summary of evidence of the public’s punitive preferences and the bidding war dynamic, 
see Huq & Lakier, supra note 79, at 1584–85. 
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fear of crime, have not declined—again, quite the contrary.183 It seems likely 
that national politicians’ reckless rhetorical choices have played a large role 
in this development.184 It thus seems most plausible to categorize legislative 
behavior as “pathological,” to use a term first deployed by Professor Bill 
Stuntz.185 
If one is cynical about the reasons that legislators have for enlarging 
each year the scope of substantive criminal law—and there is no shortage of 
reasons for cynicism—then the correct response might be to extend Professor 
Orin Kerr’s equilibrium-adjustment theory to encompass legislative 
changes. Professor Kerr argues that courts should strive to maintain an 
equilibrium between the scope of police power and the domain of individual 
privacy. He applies his equilibrium-adjustment model to “changing 
technology and social practice,” contending that if “new tools and new 
practices threaten to expand or contract police power in a significant way, 
courts [do and should] adjust the level of Fourth Amendment protection to 
try to restore the prior equilibrium.”186 There is no reason, though, to cabin 
the analysis in this way. If courts respond to exogenous shocks such as 
technology and diffuse social practice, they should also compensate for 
legislative changes to the scope of criminal law. On this view, the 
appropriate judicial response to legislative changes in crime policy is not so 
much to acquiesce as to resist the pressure imposed on the criminal justice 
system by the one-way legislative hydraulic. Such resistance would entail a 
countervailing Fourth Amendment ratchet that responds to the dynamic 
legislative and presidential politics of crime by incrementally circumscribing 
the reach of police power. 
It is obvious that this is not the Fourth Amendment that we have. Rather, 
our Fourth Amendment has gradually lost force through time, in particular 
through the expansion of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, 
even as the scope of criminal law has expanded. Given the way in which the 
 
 183 In the election year of 2016, for example, fear of crime was at rates that had not been seen 
since 2001. Alyssa Davis, In U.S., Concern About Crime Climbs to 15-Year High, GALLUP (Apr. 6, 
2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/190475/americans-concern-crime-climbs-yearhigh.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/AF4F-NYQK]. 
 184 John J. Donohue, Comey, Trump, and the Puzzling Pattern of Crime in 2015 and Beyond, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1302 (2017) (concluding that “Comey and Trump probably contributed 
to the increase in the public’s apprehension of crime, which likely aided Trump’s law-and-order 
candidacy”). 
 185 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
513–18 (2001) (offering a now-classic political economy account of the inflationary dynamics of 
criminal legislation). 
 186 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 480 (2011). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
740 
federal judiciary closely tracks contemporary political preferences,187 it 
seems fair to doubt that a contrapuntal Fourth Amendment law is politically 
plausible. Indeed, even at its most seemingly countermajoritarian, the 
Supreme Court itself stuck closely to broadly shared views of appropriate 
policing.188 In sum, if we do have a doctrine that moves in rough lockstep 
with the increasing punitiveness of legislatures, this is not an example of 
“acquiescence”: It is rather a failure of institutional design flowing from the 
tight linkage between judicial preferences and the policy judgments of 
nationally elected officials. 
B. The Burkean Justification 
The second argument for using gloss in the Fourth Amendment context 
is epistemic. Official practice merits judicial respect, on this account, 
because it is a distillation of hard-won wisdom about the tools needed to 
suppress crime. Recognition of this epistemic asymmetry requires judges not 
merely to adopt a posture of deference regarding specific policy arguments 
proffered by the police but also to incorporate the collective, hard-won 
wisdom of police agencies into the very fabric of the doctrine. This line of 
argument can be discerned in cases that employ gloss as substantive 
content—including the misdemeanor warrantless arrest and vehicular search 
lines of precedent—as well as those that use gloss as substitute. Even the 
gloss as benchmark cases rest on an assumption that wisdom is to be derived 
from police practice, but they assume that the wisdom is not evenly spread 
across policing agencies. 
As plausible as these arguments sound at first blush, they are beset by 
deep theoretical and empirical difficulties. To see this, it is necessary to start 
with a definition of reasonableness against which the Court’s judgments can 
be measured. Consider one possibility189: An official practice such as 
warrantless misdemeanor arrests or warrantless vehicular searches can be 
plausibly ranked as reasonable only if its net social benefits are positive. 
Under this definition, a policing practice that externalizes greater costs than 
 
 187 On the weakness of judicial independence from contemporary political control, see Aziz Z. 
Huq, Democratic Erosion and the Courts: Comparative Perspectives, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 
21, 28 (2018). 
 188 Even in the supposedly halcyon days of the Warren Court, constitutional criminal procedure 
doctrine was substantially less countermajoritarian than commonly assumed. See Corinna Barrett 
Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal 
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1379–82, 1394, 1411 (2004). 
 189 To be clear, I am not asserting that this is the definition used by the Court, which does not tend 
to formulate its analysis in this domain in welfarist terms. Rather, it is my position that net social gain 
seems a plausible minimal threshold for what counts as “reasonable” policing. An alternative formulation 
might be that the police could reasonably have believed that a practice’s benefits outweighed its costs. 
113:701 (2019) Fourth Amendment Gloss 
741 
its benefits is not reasonable. A decision to forego such a practice would 
improve social welfare.190 To demand that policing practices advance social 
welfare (however defined) is not to demand that they achieve the maximum 
amount of crime suppression, or that they be the best “feasible” approach to 
the problem of maintaining social order.191 It is simply to ask that they help 
more than they hurt. It is thus a plausible way of giving some minimal and 
uncontroversial content to the inchoate term “reasonable” against which the 
Court’s use of gloss can be compared. 
With this benchmark in mind, there are three reasons for rejecting the 
Burkean justification. First, the political economy of policing—as shaped in 
particular by influential actors such as police unions, insurers, and municipal 
governments—is inconsistent with the production and sustaining of behavior 
that produces greater net benefits than costs. Second, the descriptive premise 
of police expertise—which is distinct from police professionalism—is 
questionable. To the extent that the case for gloss is epistemic in character, 
it requires that officials themselves acquire information upon which to make 
sensible judgments. There is scant reason to believe this occurs in the 
policing context.  
Finally, to the extent that it is the historical durability of a police 
practice that attracts judicial deference, the argument from Burkean wisdom 
fails to account for the shifting assumptions and justifications that animate 
police practice. What seems like a stable practice from one perspective can, 
when viewed in light of the changing missions and priorities of police, 
appear instead as a multiplicity of tactics sharing only a superficial 
connection. Together, these three points substantially undermine the 
persuasiveness of a Burkean justification for judicial reliance on gloss. 
1. Gloss and the Political Economy of Policing 
An unstated assumption of the argument from Burkean wisdom is that 
the political economy of policing—that is, the network of social, political, 
and institutional vectors that generate police practice—will not predictably 
 
 190 I assume a capacious account of costs and benefits that includes the nonmonetized privacy 
and dignity values that different jurists have perceived as furthered by the Fourth Amendment. 
Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting privacy 
as the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment), with id. at 369–72 (Black, J., dissenting) (focusing on 
“physical” or “actual intrusion” and dealing with seizures of “tangible[]” items), and Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to 
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”). 
 191 That is, the constitutional analysis is distinct from feasibility analysis in the regulatory 
context, in which an agency will “examine only whether a particular level of regulation is 
technologically and economically feasible: whether the technological means exist to implement the 
regulation, and whether the regulation will cause significant economic harm.” Jonathan S. Masur & 
Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 663 (2010). 
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embrace practices that impose costs larger than their benefits. My aim in this 
Section is to cast doubt on that assumption by focusing on the key 
institutional actors whose interests determine the shape of policing. The 
observed preferences and incentives of these actors do not conduce, I argue, 
to cost-justified policing measures, but rather to measures that predictably 
externalize costs without commensurate gains in public safety. 
A caution is warranted up front: The idea that policing measures might 
be unjustified in pure cost–benefit terms has recently been applied to specific 
policing measures, such as stop-and-frisk,192 and also to the criminal justice 
system as a whole.193 My approach here is not to analyze discrete practices. 
Rather, I focus on the incentives of pivotal actors in the criminal justice 
system. I suggest that the incentives of these actors are to “overuse the most 
punitive and immediately rewarding criminal justice tools . . . and underuse 
others . . . which probably generate positive externalities.”194 
The core of my argument here can be stated succinctly: The practice of 
policing responds to pressures from police unions, which represent the rank-
and-file officers themselves; from the management and political leadership 
of municipalities (or whatever other jurisdictional unit police are organized 
by); and (outside of large cities at least) from insurers.195 None of these forces 
conduces clearly toward compliance with constitutional rules. Indeed, none 
of them has a clear incentive to press toward cost-justified policing measures. 
As a result, it is exceedingly unlikely that police departments—even if 
subject to contemporary forms of management and political oversight—will 
endeavor to maximize compliance with constitutional rights or even to 
minimize the negative externalities of policing. 
Let us start with unions. These have long been understood to be a major 
influence on the forms and practices of policing.196 Rejuvenated police 
unions emerged in the 1970s, mobilizing around demands for contractual 
 
 192 Huq, supra note 167, at 2413–20. 
 193 Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
187, 189 (2017) (“In economic terms, criminal justice presents a classic case of externalities, 
particularly negative externalities. Individual actors, agencies, and different levels of government 
benefit from pursuing individually rational actions but do not suffer the costs they individually and 
collectively impose upon others.”). 
 194 Id. 
 195 I focus here on the structural, organized forces that shape police behavior. Another lens 
would train on demographic changes, although it is not clear that recent changing racial patterns in 
hiring have made much of a difference. See David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police 
Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1210 (2006). 
 196 Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 720 
(2017) (flagging “a general scholarly consensus that police unions play an important role in policing 
and politics”). 
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protections for officers charged with disciplinary offenses.197 The collective 
bargaining agreements (CBAs) reached by police unions now often contain 
procedural protections for internal investigations that impede all efforts to 
verify the facts of discrete incidents. Among other measures, these 
agreements often delay misconduct-related interviews, allow the accused 
access to evidence before being interviewed, bar the investigation of 
anonymous complaints, and limit the duration of investigations.198 These 
procedural protections collectively reduce the rate at which allegations of 
unconstitutional conduct are identified, increase the cost of investigating 
such allegations, and reduce the extent to which police management are both 
aware of illegalities and capable of responding to them.199 Beyond these 
systemic effects, there is some evidence that unionization is associated with 
a stricter, more coercive form of policing.200 In short, available quantitative 
and qualitative studies of police unionization suggest that this powerful 
institutional force will press for institutional practices that maximize the 
extent to which the costs of policing are externalized to the public, minimize 
information about those externalities, and elicit more aggressive and 
coercive tactics. 
One might ask whether these forces can be controlled by either 
expertise or democratic politics. Managerial controls on the behavior of 
rank-and-file officers, to be sure, might in theory be expected to constrain 
some of these tendencies. But in practice they are not likely to do so to any 
great extent.201 Empirical studies suggest that management is distrusted by 
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Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1222 (2017). 
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(“Collective bargaining rights deter department-wide changes intended to prevent constitutional 
violations.”); Huq & McAdams, supra note 198, at 237 (“Delay privileges suppress that information 
even within the police department. Absent strong leadership from police management, it is likely 
that the signal of low rates of problematic police force will be treated as evidence that police comply 
with relevant limits on the use of force.”). 
 200 John M. Magenau & Raymond G. Hunt, Police Unions and the Police Role, 49 HUMAN REL. 
1315, 1330–31 (1996). 
 201 On the acute separation of rank-and-file from management within police departments, see Akiva 
M. Liberman et al., Routine Occupational Stress and Psychological Distress in Police, 25 POLICING: 
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rank-and-file officers, especially when it comes to matters of discipline.202 
The dispersed and largely unobservable character of street policing also 
means that management often lacks information about street-level behavior, 
where the majority of costly police action occurs. As Professor Wesley 
Skogan has observed, “[m]ost police officers work alone or with a partner, 
and the top brass know little about what they do out there except what they 
report on pieces of paper that they sometimes fill out to document their 
activities.”203 Typically management responds to this epistemic dilemma by 
tracking only outcomes, such as the volume of arrests, that are only loosely 
correlated with the cost-justified creation of public order.204 This is a deeply 
perverse metric by which to measure the success of police practice. Arrests 
for minor infractions in particular—quite apart from the costs they impose 
on suspects—may be unjustified solely in terms of “lost crime prevention 
opportunities.”205 Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the kind of 
misdemeanor arrests embraced on the basis of gloss in Atwater have no 
deterrent effect on serious crime.206 
The existence of pervasive deficiencies of trust and information implies 
that managerial control is likely to be incomplete. There is every reason to 
anticipate that information will not be candidly conveyed by the rank-and-
file, especially when it concerns potentially tortious behavior that 
externalizes costs to civilians.207 Consistent with this prediction,208 larger 
 
LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 33–34 (1968) (finding that police had “a preoccupation with 
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William A. Westley, Secrecy and the Police, 34 SOC. FORCES 254, 256 (1956). The development of 
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effect that managers are perceived as “mere disciplinarians.” EGON BITTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE 
WORK 136, 143 (1990). 
 203 Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 23, 24 (2008). 
 204 See Michael Tonry, From Policing to Parole: Reconfiguring American Criminal Justice, 
46 CRIME & JUST. 1, 12 (2017) (stating that police forces often prioritize arrests over other measures 
of performance); accord Stuntz, supra note 185, at 538 (“[P]olice are more likely to maximize 
arrests.”). 
 205 Cynthia Lum & Daniel S. Nagin, Reinventing American Policing, 46 CRIME & JUST. 339, 
344–45 (2017). 
 206 Id. at 353. 
 207 See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 453, 501 (2004). 
 208 See Ulrika Haake et al., Police Leaders Make Poor Change Agents: Leadership Practice in 
the Face of a Major Organisational Reform, 27 POLICING & SOC.: INT’L J. RES. & POL’Y 764, 764 
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police departments seem to experience higher rates of misconduct than small 
ones.209 Larger departments, all things being equal, have more difficulty in 
monitoring and regulating the discretionary decisions of line officers. All 
else being equal, therefore, we should not anticipate that management will 
intervene and limit conduct that is unjustified because it externalizes more 
costs than the benefits it creates. 
These limits of managerial influence on police rank-and-file, coupled 
with the sway of police unions, also constrain the effect of elected officials’ 
policy preferences on police behavior. Elected officials, after all, whether at 
the state or local level, must work through management to influence the 
contours of street policing. Today, state laws “cover at best only a small 
portion of police management issues and day-in day-out police activities.”210 
In contrast, the historical record of local political control of police 
departments demonstrates that police departments were functionally 
“[a]djunct[s] of the [political] [m]achine,” and as such were empowered by 
patronage and graft.211 Celebrations of local, democratic influence on 
policing fail to grapple with this recalcitrant record, which undercuts 
optimism about the valence of democratic policing.212 Neither state nor local 
control of policing, therefore, appears to be robustly welfare enhancing. 
Moreover, where we are able to observe directly elected officials’ 
influence on policing, we do not see a tendency to gravitate toward cost-
justified outcomes. Rather, there is a bent toward regressive and unjustified 
decision-making. A particularly salient body of evidence concerns the 
distribution of fiscal resources within states. Spending patterns, which reflect 
the aggregate views of many local leaders, can be examined to determine 
whether they are better explained by patterns of crime or by the concentration 
of racial and ethnic groups. Even in areas where a racial or ethnic minority 
has a measure of political control, such as in the American Southwest, studies 
 
(2017) (finding, based on twenty-eight case studies, that “the idea that police leaders will be able to 
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have found socioeconomic class and proximity to the border—and not 
crime—best predict the fiscal allocation of policing resources.213 More 
generally, “empirical research also provides considerable support for the 
argument that both the resources and the coercive strategies of policing are 
distributed in accordance with the racial and ethnic makeup of 
communities.”214 
This does not mean that minority communities obtain more or better 
protection than majority ones. To the contrary, the rate of civil rights 
complaints against police is also a function of the minority (black and 
Hispanic) share of the population.215 Although not dispositive, these patterns 
of reported complaints suggest that political control of policing, even if 
possible to extend beyond relatively coarse metrics such as funding, would 
not necessarily result in cost-justified tactics. Democratic control of policing 
more generally cannot be expected to yield cost-justified measures where 
there is an observable minority that can be expected to bear the brunt of 
negative externalities without being able to change electoral outcomes.216 
Recent literature has turned to the role of insurance companies in 
supplying the incentives for police to behave in cost-justified ways. One 
commentator suggests that “an insurer writing police liability insurance may 
profit by reducing police misconduct” and that “the insurer may be better 
positioned than the government to reform police behavior.”217 But insurers 
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are motivated to install loss prevention programs only to the extent that they 
anticipate liability. Most cost-unjustified behavior—such as minor uses of 
force that leave no broken bones or visible marks or unlawful searches that 
generate no lasting damage—will typically not yield tort suits. It seems likely 
that many who experience compensable harms do not sue because of the 
transaction costs of the civil justice system, to say nothing of qualified 
immunity and other bespoke barriers to relief in the constitutional tort 
context.218 If insurers’ incentives to reform are circumscribed by the shadow 
of liability, and liability often does not extend very far, then the case for 
thinking that insurers will ameliorate unjustified police behavior is 
necessarily too weak to be convincing.219 
In short, the assumption that police will elect cost-justified tactics is in 
tension with the preferences of rank-and-file police as articulated by their 
union representatives in CBAs, the weakness of managerial oversight, and 
the limited incentives of both political and private actors to ameliorate 
socially unjustified patterns of policing. These forces tend to externalize 
social cost in particular to racial and ethnic minorities, rather than pressing 
toward cost-justified policing. As a result, the official practice covered by 
the Fourth Amendment will often fail to break even in social welfare terms. 
If that practice often imposes greater costs than benefits, it is hard indeed to 
see why it should be ranked as “reasonable” under any plausible definition 
of that term. Observed policing practice is not a reliable source of 
information about what is a “reasonable” search or seizure because there is 
no reason to believe it will systematically gravitate toward cost-justified 
norms. This suggests that the gloss as substantive content cannot be 
predicated on Burkean grounds. 
2. The Elusive Concept of Police Expertise 
A second basis for treating gloss as a distillate of Burkean wisdom 
would look to the ability of the police to accumulate and act on information 
that only they have access to about the costs and benefits of their policy 
choices. The problem with this argument is that its central premise of 
epistemic competence is false. 
Police departments simply do not collect the information necessary to 
make informed judgments on what policies are cost-justified. Rather, as 
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Professor Rachel Harmon has documented, police departments tend to “limit 
rather than promote information availability,” and often fail to create or 
publicize information that is necessary for sensible regulation of policing.220 
She explains this in terms of the “significant counterincentives” related to 
liability and negative publicity that lead police management to “underinvest 
in research” that could improve the quality of policing.221 Even records 
generated internally, such as disciplinary documentation, are often hedged 
with legal constraints, such as CBA-mandated expungement regimes, that 
limit their utility.222 For example, the authority of internal affairs units to 
generate reliable information about police conduct is often constrained by 
rules that require them to elicit information only in writing and only after 
giving suspects up to a week to respond.223 
Another potential source of information about externalities is the body 
of lawsuits filed against police based on federal or state law violations. 
Because these suits tend almost uniformly to be indemnified,224 it would in 
theory be simple for the indemnifying government to evaluate how much 
police misconduct is costing—although note that even this is just a lower 
bound on actual costs, since not all constitutional tortfeasors will be sued. 
But even in respect to this one limited set of data, municipalities often fall 
short. Extensive research by Professor Joanna Schwartz has demonstrated 
that most departments ignore lawsuits that do not generate negative 
publicity; that municipal counsel defend most suits without regard to their 
merits; that settlements and judgments are paid by the municipalities and not 
the department; and that departments fail to keep track of officers named as 
defendants, evidence presented against them, or even payouts.225 Hence, 
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even when there is a ready, if incomplete, record of actions that plainly fail 
to comply with existing legal standards and that externalize costs, police 
departments routinely fail to acquire or use that information. The assumption 
of epistemic competence upon which the Burkean justification is based, 
therefore, falls woefully short of reality. 
The fragility of police claims to epistemic advantage is consistent with 
recent historical work exploring the origins of judicial deference in the 
criminal justice space. The bold assertion of police “expertise” is a historical 
artifact of the police professionalism movement of the 1950s.226 As Professor 
Lvovsky’s recent historical scholarship demonstrates, judicial decisions 
invoked “the police’s criminological insights as grounds for deference under 
the Fourth Amendment” despite a “wealth of research questioning the value 
of police judgment.”227 She describes the emergence of a judicial 
understanding of police work “as a task capable of producing rarified and 
systematic ‘expert’ knowledge” as a result of judges’ exposure to police as 
putative experts and reformers across a range of contexts.228 On Professor 
Lvovsky’s account, the presumption of police expertise has never been based 
on a demonstration of actual expertise. 
The Burkean justification, in short, can no more be vindicated on the 
basis that police are more knowledgeable than on the basis that they are 
motivated, all else being equal, by socially desirable incentives and 
organizational forces. 
3. The Evolving Modalities of Policing 
A final problem impedes the Burkean justification. The standard 
Burkean argument hinges on the idea that “the past has an authority of its 
own which, however circumscribed, is inherent and direct rather than 
derivative.”229 As Burke himself put it, when making “practical” decisions 
about “the science of government,” one should be aware that  
however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite caution than any 
man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any 
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tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up 
again without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.230 
It is, though, to be doubted whether policing is “an edifice which has 
answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society.” 
Police roles have not been fixed over time, and they have not been focused 
on a “common” purpose over their history. Rather, the central task of police 
is to solve “problems” in public order as they arise.231 The nature of the 
problems that policing aims to solve, though, has changed dramatically over 
time.232 Consequently, the substance of policing has an evolving, mutative 
quality. This is evident from even a rapid summary of the development of 
policing since its advent some 180 years ago. 
The first police forces, which emerged in cities like Philadelphia and 
Charleston in the 1820s and 1830s, took very different trajectories.233 In 
Southern cities, police were primarily tasked with maintaining the practice 
of slavery.234 Through the end of Jim Crow in the 1960s, Southern police 
“represented the South’s repressive civil order and the ideology of white 
supremacy.”235 In Northern cities, through much of the nineteenth century, 
there were no criteria for becoming a police officer—only “having the right 
political connections”—and no training for the job.236 Urban police 
undertook a vast hodgepodge of activities “unexpected by their original 
creators,” including returning lost children, shooting stray dogs, enforcing 
sanitation laws, inspecting boilers, and conducting censuses.237 Their roles 
were also shaped by national events. We have already seen hints of how 
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Prohibition influenced the Fourth Amendment in cases such as Carroll.238 
Policing more generally changed character both with Prohibition and also 
with the early twentieth century’s “rise of a national security apparatus to 
ward off external threats and the churn of disorder from anarchists and 
criminals.”239 
It was only in the post-World War II years that “police professionalism” 
emerged as a dominant approach, with some departments making “notable 
progress in raising recruitment and training standards.”240 Part of the 
professionalism movement was a resistance to having police undertake tasks 
other than crime control.241 Advocates of professionalism argued for a more 
centralized, quasi-military structure. As a result, the twentieth century saw 
changes to police forces’ typical command structures, their core routine tasks 
(for example, the decline of foot patrols in favor of motorized patrols and the 
specialization by unit within larger police forces), their information systems, 
and their demographic composition.242 This is not to say that professionalism 
was an unqualified success. To the contrary, professionalized police proved 
quite “unable to respond” to the Civil Rights Movement’s demands for racial 
justice.243 The “primarily reactive” character of professionalized policing 
yielded to an embrace of some sort of community policing in the 1960s.244 
Today, policing is changing once again as new big-data technologies alter its 
deployment and even its aims.245 Perhaps in another decade or two, what it 
means to be police will once again be fundamentally quite different. 
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Given the historical contingency of the policing function, it should be 
no surprise that policing organizations now take highly varied forms,246 much 
as they have taken divergent forms over time.247 The fiscal resources 
available for the policing of similar populations in different parts of the 
United States can also differ by an order of magnitude.248 This variance in 
underlying fiscal realities directly impinges on the style and manner of 
policing. In Ferguson, Missouri, to pick a well-publicized example, court 
fines and fees were the second largest source of municipal income. As a 
consequence of this reliance, in 2013, Ferguson’s municipal court issued 
some 32,975 arrest warrants for nonviolent offenses within a population of 
around 21,000.249 Ferguson is not unique in its reliance on fines and fees 
generated by policing activity.250 But because not all jurisdictions follow 
Ferguson’s example, it is wrong to think about policing as a monolithic 
species of behavior. Rather, it is to be expected that policing strategies will 
vary greatly between different jurisdictions depending on their policing 
histories, racial composition, and economic condition. 
4. Implications for Fourth Amendment Gloss 
A careful accounting of the political, economic, and information-
gathering practices of police forces, along with a consideration of both the 
historical and current heterogeneity of policing, undermines the case for 
Fourth Amendment gloss from Burkean wisdom. Indeed, it suggests that all 
three ways in which gloss has been deployed—as substance, as benchmark, 
and as substitute—are ultimately theoretically unsatisfying. 
To begin with, the objections raised in this Section suggest that official 
practice should not be employed as substantive content in the Fourth 
Amendment context. The political, economic, informational, and historical 
perspectives on policing practices are not consistent with the conclusion that 
policing will necessarily involve cost-justified measures. Stable and 
 
 246 PETER K. MANNING, POLICING CONTINGENCIES 43–45 (2003) (documenting variations). 
 247 WADHAM & ALLISON, supra note 232, at 15 (“A modern police department and a nineteenth 
century department may not seem comparable at first glance.”). 
 248 David Thacher, The Distribution of Police Protection, 27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 
275, 291 (2011) (noting disparities and measuring the extent to which they are dampened by federal 
subsidies). 
 249 Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1724 (2015); see also CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_d
epartment_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/78FK-6555] (“City officials have consistently set maximizing 
revenue as the priority for Ferguson’s law enforcement activity.”). 
 250 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1098 (2015) 
(noting that “many lower courts and municipalities depend heavily on revenues from fines and fees 
imposed on minor offenders”). 
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commonly used forms of policing, such as the warrantless misdemeanor 
stops or the warrantless vehicular searches, cannot be reliably ranked as cost-
justified merely because they have a long historical pedigree or because they 
are commonly used today. In the absence of incentives or institutions to root 
out inefficient tactics, there is no reason to think the stock of enduring 
policing practices will include only cost-justified measures.251 
These three critiques also suggest a limit to the utility of gloss as 
benchmark. To be sure, the mere existence of historical and synchronic 
variance in policing practices252 is not alone enough to preclude an inference 
from gloss, as Evenwel v. Abbott suggested.253 And at first blush, it would 
seem to invite the benchmarking inquiry. But as Professors Masur and 
Posner have pointed out in the administrative law context, the mere fact that 
there is variance among regulated entities does not mean that it is possible to 
isolate cost-justified tactics merely by eliminating some outlier practices.254 
In both the administrative and the policing contexts, it may well be that an 
overwhelming majority of regulated entities are engaged in actions that are 
cost-unjustified. In the policing context this seems quite likely. If almost all 
police departments are dominated by unions, if they use performance metrics 
that are misleading proxies for cost-justified policies (such as the volume of 
arrests), and if they fail to acquire or analyze even basic performance-related 
data, then I think we should be skeptical of Fourth Amendment gloss as a 
measure of minimally good policing. 
Worse, when the Court makes the assumption that the modal (or 
median) form of policing is a socially desirable one, as in cases such as Mapp 
v. Ohio255 and Tennessee v. Garner,256 we might be concerned that the 
imprimatur of constitutional approval is so persuasive to officials and the 
public that it ends reform conversations prematurely. Gloss as 
benchmarking, that is, may not only be based on a false premise of epistemic 
competence. It may also simultaneously dangerously enervate local reform 
impetus. 
Historical change in the objects and social understandings of policing, 
moreover, poses challenges to the Court’s endorsement of new practices, 
such as DNA testing in Maryland v. King, on the theory that they are 
 
 251 Many of these critiques apply also to equilibrium accounts of the Fourth Amendment. See 
Kerr, supra note 186, at 480. 
 252 See supra text accompanying notes 233–247. 
 253 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); see supra text accompanying note 37. 
 254 Masur & Posner, supra note 127, at 30–33. 
 255 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 256 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
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genealogically rooted in established practices, such as fingerprinting.257 The 
Court’s gloss analogy omits important details that might cast doubt on the 
strength of the normative inference that may be drawn from historical 
identification practices. The Court did not mention that fingerprinting was 
initially adopted by the FBI, and then by police departments, as a way to 
manage the new “racially unfamiliar” masses perceived as a menace to early 
twentieth-century American society.258 Nor did it mention the resistance to 
fingerprinting as a new intrusion on privacy. In 1920, a Cleveland, Ohio, 
ordinance mandating fingerprinting, for example, generated a cab drivers’ 
strike, with hundreds manning “antifingerprint picket lines.”259 The King 
Court’s analysis instead simply assumed that fingerprinting is now and 
always has been a neutral, technocratic tool with no racial overtones and no 
popular resistance. Yet with a dose more history to hand, DNA sampling 
may well be understood in different terms. Like fingerprinting, its initial use 
may have racially disparate effects.260 The earlier discomfort with sharing 
fingerprints may be paralleled today by a similar discomfort with sharing 
DNA.261 The Court’s failure to account for these historical parallels—which 
would undermine its use of gloss to support lower Fourth Amendment 
protections against DNA collection in King—suggest that its use of gloss is 
both descriptively and normatively problematic.262 
Finally, many of these same criticisms can be extended to gloss as 
substitute. In particular, the variance in the quality of police departments and 
the likely persistence of many costly and hence unjustified police practices 
 
 257 569 U.S. 435, 461 (2013) (affirming touchstone of reasonableness); see supra text 
accompanying notes 123–26. 
 258 SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL 
IDENTIFICATION 3, 119–20 (2001). 
 259 CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA: FROM SLAVERY TO THE WAR 
ON TERROR 52–57 (2003). 
 260 Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 189 (2013) (expressing concern about how DNA testing of arrestees will 
interact with the “highly disproportionate enforcement of especially low-level offenses”). 
 261 For some evidence of that discomfort, see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262–
63 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), where Justice Gorsuch discussed governmental acquisition of 
DNA from third parties as something that would violate reasonable expectations of privacy. 
 262 Judicial opinions can also be responses to problems that are unmentioned in the text of the 
opinion but are important chapters in American policing. The failure to understand these hidden 
transcripts can lead to systematic error in glossing cases. Professor Sklansky has demonstrated, for 
example, that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), responded “to the widespread use of a 
particularly troubling investigative technique, unrelated to telephone eavesdropping, without ever 
mentioning the technique itself. The technique was patrolling for homosexual sodomy by spying on 
men in toilet stalls.” David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and 
the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 879 (2008). This 
understanding puts new light on the idea of “reasonable” expectations of privacy, yet Professor 
Sklansky’s vital insight is largely missed in the current scholarship. 
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undermine the rationales for across-the-board remedial withdrawal by the 
Court in Hudson v. Michigan263 or Herring v. United States.264 If police 
practice is often cost-unjustified, if assumptions about police expertise are 
muddled and in conflict with the facts, and if the wide variance in police 
departments precludes broad generalizations, the Court’s blind reliance in 
Hudson and Herring on a happy story of ever-increasing professionalism is 
unjustified and perhaps even irresponsible. 
The Burkean case for Fourth Amendment gloss, therefore, fails. 
Whether viewed across time or just today, official police practice cannot be 
taken as a normatively justified gloss relevant to the Fourth Amendment’s 
interpretation. 
C. The Settlement Justification 
The settlement justification turns on the social value of a stable, clear, 
and readily available focal point to facilitate coordination and evaluation of 
government behavior in light of ambiguous constitutional standards. 
Because a constitutional focal point can usefully be derived from well-
known historical practice, gloss provides a logical, low-cost coordinating 
point to generate a stable constitutional equilibrium. A focal point plays one 
function for officials, who must operate within the frame of constitutional 
institutions. It has a different function for citizens, who can use gloss to 
evaluate whether those actors remain faithful to their constitutional 
obligations. In addition, a case for gloss as a well-publicized and readily 
referenced benchmark of constitutionality can be derived independently of 
any assertion about the quality, or epistemic content, of official practice. 
The focal point model of constitutional enforcement by citizens closely 
fits the original function of the Fourth Amendment. At its core, the focal 
point model addresses a central problem of political theory: A sovereign 
must “retain sufficient political support” to remain stable, but in order to do 
so, it must persuade citizens that it is not abusing its delegated authorities.265 
Because citizens may disagree on what constitutes abuse, they face a 
coordination dilemma: Unless there is agreement on the legitimate bounds 
of the state, they will be unable to act together to limit state abuses. Focal 
points “resolve [such] coordination dilemmas about the appropriate limits on 
the state,” often in terms that generally redound to the benefit of political 
“elites,” who are central to political contestation and opposition.266 The focal 
 
 263 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006). 
 264 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009). 
 265 Weingast, supra note 71, at 246. 
 266 Id. (“To the extent that solutions to the coordination dilemma occur, it is elites who construct 
them, often through pacts.”). 
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point theory can also be profitably read in tandem with Professor Ran 
Hirschl’s influential theory of constitutional design as “hegemonic 
preservation.”267 On this view, elites maintain wealth and privileges even 
after ceding political power in a constitutional moment by crafting negative 
rights that limit the newly formed state.268 
As originally conceived, the Fourth Amendment is plausibly viewed as 
a solution to precisely this problem of elite–public coordination over the 
appropriate limits of state power. The two English legal precedents that 
provided the impetus and template for that provision hinged on state efforts 
to use home searches to harass and disrupt political opponents. These 
aversive precedents both involved civil actions by opposition 
parliamentarians challenging searches of homes and offices by agents of the 
secretary of state in search of evidence of sedition.269 Seditious libel 
investigations often relied upon such “general searches for documentary 
evidence.”270 Given this history of policing political dissent through paper 
searches,271 it was eminently sensible for American political elites to agree 
on the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches. 
Anticipating the prospect of time in opposition, those elites could look to the 
Fourth Amendment as a protection against the specific instrument of political 
oppression that (to their minds) was most immediately available and 
effective. The Amendment is in a sense “really about the protection of 
political dissent,”272 with gloss providing the focal point for social 
coordination in the event that elected leaders target such dissent. 
If the settlement justification explains the original thrust of the Fourth 
Amendment, it does little to explain its operation now. The English 
precedents are a gloss that has largely been abandoned. The Court briefly 
resurrected the paper searches rule at the end of the nineteenth century in 
 
 267 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (2004); see also MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
SUBJECT: SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITY 197–201 (2010) (developing a notion 
of “pacted constitution-making” pursuant to which powerful interest groups treat the constitution as 
a coordinated truce). 
 268 HIRSCHL, supra note 267, at 89, 91–92. 
 269 See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1066, 1073 (Eng. C.P.); 
Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489 (C.P.); see also William Stuntz, The Substantive 
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 397–404 (1995) (discussing the significance of 
Wilkes and Entick). 
 270 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868, at 18 (2006). 
 271 See Entick, 19 Howell’s State Trials at 1066, 1073 (noting that papers are a person’s “dearest 
property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection”). 
 272 Stuntz, supra note 269, at 447. 
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Boyd v. United States.273 Boyd, however, proved to have a limited shelf life 
and is no longer compelling as a Fourth Amendment precedent.274 As a result, 
the fact that a search incident to arrest yields intimate papers, such as a diary, 
rather than narcotics would have no bearing on the resulting analysis. 
Contemporary Fourth Amendment law sharply diverges from the model 
of gloss as settlement. To begin with, settlement implies a static model of 
official practice that can be used as a basis for drawing Fourth Amendment 
law. But when Fourth Amendment gloss is used as a benchmark or a 
substitute, official practice has not been treated as static and unchanging. 
Rather, the Court treats such practice as dynamic, varying between 
jurisdictions and over time. It is only when gloss is used as substantive 
content that the settlement explanation is even available: Longstanding 
practices accepted as baseline for lawful searches and seizures might provide 
focal points for individuals, unschooled in the law, to signal when 
government was overstepping its authority. 
And yet the Court has not deployed gloss as substantive content in ways 
that facilitate coordination among citizens when government oversteps 
constitutional bounds. The primary examples of gloss as substantive content, 
to the contrary, concern the authorization of practices such as warrantless 
arrests based on misdemeanors and warrantless searches of automobiles.275 
Neither of these lines of cases provides citizens with clear information about 
the limits of state power. To the extent that they rely on the settlement 
justification, Atwater, Watson, Carroll, and their progeny might be 
understood as focal points for police who are uncertain of their authority. 
These decisions thus provide a license for such officers to rely on 
longstanding policing habits and practices without reflecting on their 
constitutionality. The cases in which I have identified gloss as substantive 
content probably lower the cost of policing insofar as they enable junior 
officers to rely on the intuitions and habits of older officers. All else being 
equal, they allow police to rest on traditional practices. They drain law 
enforcement’s incentive to innovate and learn, and—at least to the extent that 
the Court has become a primary regulator of the police276—they undermine 
the incentive to innovate and improve policing. A judicial thumb is placed 
 
 273 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (holding that any “seizure of a man’s private books and papers” 
violates the Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment(s)). 
 274 See generally Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. 
REV. 869, 915–23 (1985) (analyzing, and decrying, post-Boyd changes to the law). 
 275 See supra text accompanying notes 92–105. 
 276 The role of the Court looms large because relevant “legislation is episodic.” Barry Friedman 
& Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1844 (2015). 
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instead on the status quo, no matter how dysfunctional. It is hard to see how 
this can be justified as a normative matter in the name of settlement. 
This is not to say that no paths of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
operate as focal points for potentially effective social coordination in 
response to state illegality. The Court has repeatedly flagged a “basic 
principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”277 Home exceptionalism 
under the Fourth Amendment, however, is not based on any historical 
practice. Rather, it seems to be predicated on an inchoate sense that homes 
are distinctive as a cultural or normative matter.278 These cases sound more 
in “a nostalgia subsidy for home ownership” rather than any understanding 
of what has historically operated as effective policing.279 
In sum, the settlement function of the law is not well served by the 
current doctrine. Although the historical practice that once provided the 
touchstone of the Court’s analysis could have provided an effectual focal 
point, the Court has abandoned that practice as a doctrinal pivot. Its turn to 
other forms of entrenched policing practice cannot be justified on settlement 
grounds. Indeed, to the extent the Court has become a dominant regulator of 
national, state, and local law enforcement, its adoption of the settlement 
justification likely engenders worse rather than better policing by crowding 
out other reform efforts. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Gloss has been an unacknowledged, yet important, element of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. It shapes the law of misdemeanor arrests, traffic 
stops, deadly force, and the scope of the suppression remedy. My aim in this 
Part has been to demonstrate that the most powerful justifications for these 
deployments of official practice in the Fourth Amendment domain are thin 
and ultimately unpersuasive. Separation of powers scholars have shown that 
there are persuasive general reasons for relying on interbranch interactions 
to formulate constitutional rules. Some of these reasons spill naturally over 
into federalism, a congruent domain of structural constitutional law. But 
none of the three justifications for gloss can explain the use of official 
 
 277 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 
559 (2004)); accord Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011). 
 278 Cf. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 913 (2010) (describing the home as a “sacred site” (quoting 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999))). 
 279 Aziz Z. Huq, How the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall) 
Together, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 139, 157 (2016). 
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practice to define search and seizure minima. Such reliance cannot be 
explained on the standard grounds for folding in official practice into 
constitutional law.280 Fourth Amendment gloss, in short, stands on fragile 
theoretical ground. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT GLOSS 
If the justifications for Fourth Amendment gloss fail, what 
consequences should this have for the actual doctrine? This Part explains 
first why Fourth Amendment gloss will persist notwithstanding its lack of 
firm normative foundation. Powerful institutional and ideological motives 
sustain the judicial practice, I contend, even in the absence of a persuasive 
normative justification. In practical terms, this means the problem of Fourth 
Amendment gloss is best thought of as a “second-best” problem.281 
Assuming that the Court will not switch to the optimal epistemological 
strategy of limited and careful reliance on official police practice, it raises 
the question whether there are measures that can be adopted to constrain the 
resulting welfare loss. In the concluding section of this Part, I therefore 
consider steps to cabin the deleterious effect of Fourth Amendment gloss’s 
place in the jurisprudence. 
A. The Peculiar Persistence of Gloss 
Since it lacks compelling normative foundations, why does gloss persist 
as a central tenet of Fourth Amendment analysis? The Court does not explain 
why it employs gloss, so it is necessary to infer the Justices’ reasons for 
relying on official practice by drawing on circumstantial evidence. I offer 
two hypotheses for why gloss has come to play so large a role in the 
jurisprudence. 
The first reason is quite simple: The Supreme Court has been tacking 
rightward since the beginning of the 1970s and President Nixon’s explicit 
 
 280 Might there be other wholly new theoretical grounds for using gloss that obtain in the Fourth 
Amendment context but not elsewhere? This is theoretically possible, but I can imagine no such 
grounds at present. 
 281 The formal theorem of the second best states that “if there is introduced into a general 
equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions [i.e., 
the circumstances that generate Pareto optimal outcomes], the other Paretian conditions, although 
still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable.” R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General 
Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956). Strictly speaking, the theory of the 
second best implies that deviations from optimality undermine the possibility of firm prescriptions. 
See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887, 904–
05 (2012). More modestly, the theory implies that when institutions are imperfect, a range of possible 
countervailing adjustments must be considered. 
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commitment to appoint Justices who shared his views on crime.282 Today, 
the Court’s median lies far to the right of where it has been for most of the 
twentieth century.283 Whatever one thinks of this ideological status quo, it 
should be no surprise that the Justices are heavily disinclined to challenge 
the authority and competence of the police. Ideological preferences no doubt 
make the institutional reasons for folding gloss into Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence more compelling. Hence, they are likely to amplify the neutral 
grounds that all judges have for deference to longstanding police practice. 
The second hypothesis turns on institutional reasons. Constitutional 
jurisprudence is not formulated in the abstract. It is shaped and channeled by 
its institutional circumstances and, in particular, by the priorities of the 
judiciary. The federal courts have “accreted gradually a great deal of 
autonomous discretion to pursue institutional interests” by lobbying 
Congress, securing functional autonomy from immediate legislative control, 
and crafting doctrinal rules.284 These interests, moreover, may illuminate 
many doctrinal decisions with cross-partisan support, decisions that appear 
otherwise mysterious.285 
The Supreme Court depends on police for the implementation of its 
Fourth Amendment rules. When the Court announces a rule that governs 
street-level police, judicial enforcement of that rule depends initially on 
whether officers truthfully report compliance or noncompliance. Much 
policing practice is embedded not in formal rules but in “tacit” routines,286 
which are hard for outsiders to grasp or evaluate. If departmental 
management has difficulty determining what happens in the context of 
dispersed, highly discretionary police–citizen encounters,287 federal courts 
are unlikely to do better. Evidence of pervasive misrepresentation by police 
in suppression hearings suggests an additional barrier to judicial 
 
 282 Jon Gottschall, Carter’s Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and 
Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 168 (1983). See 
generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS 
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 3–5 (2011). 
 283 Cf. Alicia Parlapiano & Karen Yourish, Where Neil Gorsuch Would Fit on the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (updated Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/31/us/ 
politics/trump-supreme-court-nominee.html [https://perma.cc/73WQ-VZ4U]. 
 284 Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 53 (2015); see also David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional 
Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2018) (enumerating institutions in which institutional interests have 
prevailed over immediate ideological concerns). 
 285 Huq, supra note 284, at 53–56 (developing this point). 
 286 On the notion of tacit understandings, see Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Tacit Inference, 
41 PHILOSOPHY 1, 2–3 (1966). 
 287 See supra text accompanying notes 201–203. 
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enforcement.288 Federal courts, further, would have some difficulty tamping 
down on pervasive misbehavior by police. In effect, their physical and 
institutional removal from police means that they must rely on indirect and 
highly imperfect measures, such as suppression and damages remedies, to 
elicit compliance from the police. Both of these remedies also curb local 
governments’ efficacy as a guarantor of public safety. Remediation thus 
comes bundled with its own negative spillovers. Further, it exposes the 
courts to political criticism.289 Hence, the courts are under some pressure to 
curtail and control Fourth Amendment rights because of the institutional 
costs of Fourth Amendment remediation.290 
To this end, it is in the institutional interest of the federal judiciary to 
find an accommodation—a modus vivendi of sorts—with the police. The 
judicial embrace of gloss can be usefully understood as one element of that 
accommodation. One reason for accommodation is the brute force of 
familiarity. Professor Lvovsky has observed that “judges routinely engage in 
a casual form of systemic factfinding, synthesizing their discrete encounters 
with officers in multiple sites of the justice system [with police] into broader 
assumptions about police competence.”291 Professor Lvovsky’s explanation 
may be most plausible for judges who have moved up through the judicial 
hierarchy. It may have less explanatory force for Justices of the Supreme 
Court, who are quite removed from the daily dynamics of district court 
litigation, especially after years and decades confined in the marble precincts 
of the apex tribunal. 
In my view, the emergence of Fourth Amendment gloss is well 
understood in terms of the political pressures on the courts as an institution 
to cabin Fourth Amendment remedies,292 a pressure that obtains even if a 
judge has not had a career moving up through the judicial hierarchy. Gloss 
purchases breathing room for judges from the costs of Fourth Amendment 
remediation (and perhaps because this breathing room is not needed as 
 
 288 Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1037, 1042–44 (1996) (discussing a number of related types of police misconduct in connection 
with Fourth Amendment requirements, including police perjury at suppression hearings and at trial, 
misstatements in police reports, and fraudulent representations in sworn warrant applications). 
 289 I am not sure whether it is ipso facto undesirable for the Court to be subject to political criticism. 
Where, as here, the objects of judicial solicitude have been politically vulnerable groups, though, such 
criticism may be as inevitable as it is undesirable. 
 290 Formal law and economics work models judicial oversight as a solution to an agency cost 
problem faced by the public that employs police and that faces the risk of creating police forces with 
excessively punitive incentives. Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law 
Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 106–07 (2016). The point here is 
that judicial oversight of the police embeds its own agency slack problem. 
 291 Lvovsky, supra note 22, at 2079. 
 292 The canonical example is President Nixon’s attack on the Warren Court. See supra note 282. 
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acutely in respect to other constitutional rights, we do not see gloss being 
used with frequency outside the Fourth Amendment to other elements of the 
Bill of Rights). By demonstrating respect and endorsement of familiar 
policing tools, courts mitigate the potential for conflict with regulated actors. 
By making it easier to maintain police “folkways,”293 courts purchase a 
measure of credibility that perhaps makes other rules easier to enforce. If 
courts do not have other rules they wish to see enforced against police, they 
have neutralized the possibility of pushback from police and their political 
allies.294 
Although these institutional and ideological grounds are unlikely to be 
formally recognized, they are likely to have powerful shaping effects on the 
doctrine. The survival of gloss as a central element of Fourth Amendment 
law is one of them. 
B. Toward the Mitigation of Gloss’s Costs 
The standard account of why Fourth Amendment law falls short focuses 
on the limits of courts’ institutional competence.295 An implication of my 
analysis is that the problem lies as much in the sources upon which judges 
rely as it does with the institutional limitations of the federal courts 
themselves. There is nothing that prevents the federal judiciary from 
examining official practice more closely and critically; nothing prevents 
Justices who do not obtain a majority, or who are preparing an opinion that 
points out weaknesses in the majority opinion, from highlighting the limits 
of policing practice. The federal judiciary has the potential to be an effective 
shield against unreasonable searches and seizures; it has just chosen not to 
play this function. With that in mind, four general lessons might be drawn to 
blunt the error-generating effects of gloss in this domain. These lessons are 
less costly to implement than a full-scale abatement of gloss arguments; 
hence, they are at least plausible reform proposals given the institutional and 
ideological dynamics I have identified. 
First, it is a mistake for scholars and citizens to conclude that the Fourth 
Amendment floor comprises a set of cost-justified policing measures. Even 
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 294 For an illuminating discussion of how police unions in California have mobilized against the 
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 295 See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 276, at 1865 (“Even in the case of 
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common measures, such as warrantless misdemeanor arrests,296 may be 
unjustified simply because their crime-suppression benefits are smaller than 
the social good possible if police were to invest their time otherwise.297 If it 
is to operate as a source of Fourth Amendment law, judges should 
acknowledge that gloss should never be sufficient in isolation to vindicate a 
challenged search or seizure. This intuition is not wholly missing from the 
Court’s approach. In cases such as Riley v. California, for example, the 
majority opinion declined to assume that a practice was cost-justified merely 
because some analog to the practice had long been employed by police.298 
The need for judicial consideration of costs and benefits should not be 
limited to instances of technological change. All policing tactics are 
“technologies” in the most general sense of that term. All were once new. If 
no court has ever engaged in the sort of careful analysis that characterized 
the Riley Court’s approach, there is simply no reason to assume that 
longstanding practice is wise or cost-justified. 
Second, and more ambitiously, judges should accept gloss solely if 
accompanied either by evidence that the policy is in fact cost-justified, or 
that it was adopted through a process whereby its likely costs have been 
recognized and acknowledged. This evidence might take one of two forms. 
First, judges might accept freestanding evidence that a proposed policing 
measure is cost-effective. Police now rarely generate such data.299 
Calibrating the deference accorded to different policing measures based on 
their empirical support is one way to incentivize the production of such 
evidence. In the interim, however, police are not without recourse. 
Criminologists have generated an impressive body of empirical scholarship 
about the kinds of policing measures that produce gains in public safety that 
outweigh the costs externalized onto citizens.300 A judicial demand for the 
actual effect of different search and seizure measures could also serve the 
salutary information-forcing function of eliciting more such studies. The 
latter are a public good. As such, they are likely to be produced at suboptimal 
rates. 
 
 296 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001). 
 297 See supra text accompanying notes 189–92. 
 298 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014). 
 299 See supra text accompanying note 220. States such as Washington have generated benefit–
cost evaluations of policing tactics. Steve Aos et al., The Comparative Costs and Benefits of 
Programs to Reduce Crime: A Review of Research Findings with Implications for Washington State, 
in COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PREVENTING CRIME 149, 149 (Brandon Welsh et al. eds., 2001). 
 300 For a recent survey, see Lum & Nagin, supra note 205, at 344. For a compelling analysis of 
best practices in street policing, see Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on 
Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633 (2014). 
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An alternative to this approach would be to follow the proposal of 
Professors Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko to “defer to police 
decisions about enforcement methods only to the extent that those decisions 
represent considered, fact-based judgments formulated with democratic 
input.”301 This proposal is not free of ambiguity. On the one hand, their 
demand for “fact-based judgments” seems to require that the policies 
adopted by police reach a certain quality threshold. On the other hand, they 
contend that “[c]ourts need not judge the police, at least in the first instance. 
They need only assure that someone is filling the regulatory void.”302 In my 
view, the process by which a policy is generated is an imperfect proxy for 
the quality of the policy itself. Where courts can ascertain whether a policing 
measure is likely to be cost-justified, I am not sure why they should fall back 
on the second-best proxy of procedure.303 
Third, courts should recognize the racial origins of many policing 
measures and consider whether those origins are consistent with the 
assumption of Burkean wisdom or acquiesced-to settlement. In other 
constitutional domains, the Court has acknowledged that formally neutral 
policies can be rooted historically in invidious beliefs about regulated 
populations.304 In the policing context, the Court has not evaluated 
longstanding practices in light of their racialized origins. It has not 
considered, for example, the relationship between vagrancy laws and 
programmatic stop-and-frisk.305 Nor has it questioned whether its 
endorsement of professionalized policing in decisions such as Hudson and 
Herring is also an endorsement of the racial politics of professional policing 
as originally articulated in the 1950s.306 To finally recognize the racial origins 
of many police practices would be a return to, rather than a break from, 
tradition. In the interwar years, the Court faced several “egregious exemplars 
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of Jim Crow justice” and used those extreme facts as the basis for “landmark 
criminal procedure decisions,” with the aim of limiting the excesses of Jim 
Crow criminal justice.307 
Finally, the case against a mechanistic reliance on gloss is at its acme 
in cases such as Riley v. California and Carpenter v. United States, which 
concern new technologies.308 Given the variance in the historical functions 
and present capacities of police, claims that there is a functional continuity 
between earlier policing tools and new technologies are almost always 
flawed. Even when such continuities exist—as in the case of fingerprinting 
and the DNA analysis authorized in Maryland v. King309—the Court is prone 
to miss the most salient ones. At the same time, the mere fact that a form of 
information acquisition was unknown before—and rendered possible by a 
new technology—should not suffice to signal its unconstitutionality.310 The 
foundation of Fourth Amendment gloss is sufficiently unstable and the 
supply of easy analogies so compromised that new investigative devices 
should be judged on their own terms, not by the unreliable and haphazard 
project of imagining continuities in the plural, complex worlds of historical 
and contemporary police practices. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial reliance on actual police practice is commonplace in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. Yet to date it has been neither theorized nor adequately 
justified by the Court. Drawing upon analogies to “historical gloss” in 
structural constitutional law—and “norming” in the administrative law 
scholarship—I have argued that the standard theoretical grounds for reliance 
on observed institutional practice do not apply seamlessly in the Fourth 
Amendment context. There is, in other words, no strong normative 
justification for judicial reliance on police practice to establish Fourth 
Amendment rules. To the extent that Fourth Amendment gloss survives, 
therefore, it is a mistake, the costs of which must be mitigated, rather than a 
virtue to be celebrated. The range of cautionary nudges with which I 
conclude is necessarily incomplete. Rather, one implication of my analysis 
is that there is much work still to be done thinking through the complex ways 
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federal courts receive and transform flawed policing practice into the basic 
law of the land. 
